The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XI | New York, Saturday, May 5, 1917 | Number 131

Contents

Editorial Notes 1

Leading Editorials
- The World in Revolution 4
- Democracy in War Taxation 5
- In France 6
- The Morality of Conscription 7
- Strange News from Russia 8
- Children in War 10

General Articles
- International Public Finance ..... Alvin Johnson 12
- Art and Common Sense ..... Leo Stein 13
- Briggs Is Briggs ..... Q. K. 15
- Expert or Strategist ..... H. Sidebotham 16
- Women Volunteers ..... Signe K. Toksvig 18

At the Capitol ..... C. M. 20

Correspondence 21

Reviews of Books
- The One and the Many ..... K. L. 25
- The Really Superior Sex 26
- Ellen Key on War ..... L. S. G. 27
- What Rhythm Is ..... G. S. 27
- The Archaic Essay ..... H. S. 28
- Recent Publications 29

SINCE Germany's peace proposal of December the situation has changed radically. It has become more than ever incalculable, and the fog of war was never so dense. Nobody knows how events may turn, and the only thing of which one can be certain is that the coming months, perhaps weeks, will bring forth news likely to throw most theories of the war off their balance. Of the new factors three are most obvious—the rise of the Socialists in the management of the Russian revolution, America's intervention, and the submarine. The new Russia has altered the conditions of settlement in the Near East, and America's presence in the war calls for a revision of Allied purposes in so far as they were based on an estimate of the balance of power. The submarine has greatly increased Germany's bargaining power, and it is necessary to recognize that it may have put Germany in a position where she can face a long war better than our Allies can. Italy is another extremely uncertain element, far more uncertain than the press has allowed the American people to know. But beneath all these things there are still more fundamental causes of unrest. The destruction of life and capital threatens to go beyond the power of recuperation. A famine of food and materials and ships is in sight.

ALL the governments are under fire. In spite of the heavy censorship the muttering in Russia increases, France shifts uneasily, Mr. Lloyd-George's government is by no means as strong as it was, there is decided friction between German factions and the dominant party in Austria-Hungary, and the German Chancellor appears to be wavering between German liberals and German conservatives. Bethmann-Hollweg is known to be politically weak, and the struggle in Germany has grown more intense. One need not quote Maximilian Harden to sustain this assertion. The utterances of the Socialists, of men like Dernburg, of papers like the Berliner Tageblatt are bolder than ever. The power of the Reichstag has grown since the beginning of the war, and things are said and done openly in Germany that were unthinkable a year ago. The lesson for this country is to keep a free hand and be ready to adjust itself quickly to changes as they may occur. Our government will serve nobody well by merely passive acquiescence and the wrong kind of humility. Events are set on a hair-trigger. Along with thorough preparation to play a part in the war, our government needs to keep its international policy flexible in order that it may seize and control what the uncertain future may bring.

WHENEVER in times past a people have arisen in their might and overthrown an autocratic political system the government of the United States has always been first officially to recognize the new republic and to comfort it with encouraging words. It was in pursuance of this time-honored policy that the Wilson administration promptly recognized the new Russian government, and this course was a perfectly explicit but not very effective way of wishing the new republic well. Fortunately, however, in this instance the Amer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ican nation has an opportunity of extending to the hard-pressed Russian democracy a kind and an amount of assistance which goes far beyond formal recognition and kind words. Russian industry, transportation and finance are all suffering terrifically from the strain of the war. If quick and generous support is not rendered the new government may well be overthrown by its powerful internal and external enemies. Only the United States still possesses a surplus of resources in money, materials and technical skill which can be sent to Russian assistance; and there is no service which Americans can perform during the war which they have reason to undertake with more zeal and more generosity than that of extending the needed aid to their struggling brethren in Russia. This is the kind of coöperation among nations which is as rare as it is useful and which under the existing barbarous international practice is reputable only in war. The United States has the chance of being an effective friend of Russia only because they both have a common enemy in Germany. If the American government had not accepted Germany as an enemy, the American people would have been unable to show their warm friendship for the new Russia. To this extent, if no further, the country may return thanks that it has renounced neutrality.

THE American Commission to Russia, whose business it will be to arrange the kind and measure of American assistance to the new government, will be confronted by a task whose importance has rarely been equaled in the annals of American diplomacy, but it will be a task no less delicate and difficult than it is important. The President is justified in taking the utmost pains to find commissioners who individually and collectively are capable of carrying on such a difficult negotiation. He needs men of varied, distinguished and proved ability, who at the same time will not arouse opposition from the immediately dominant element in Russian public opinion. From this point of view the objections which have been made by Russian residents in this country to the selection of Mr. Root as the head of the commission have undeniable force. Mr. Root is, of course, a man of distinguished and proved ability, who certainly should be called upon to serve his country during the crisis of the war; and he is entitled to the utmost credit for accepting so arduous and uncomfortable a commission. But he would have served his country better by refusing than by accepting. If Russia were a stable republic, such as France, Mr. Root's appointment would have been unexceptionable. As it happens, however, Russia is ruled by a revolutionary committee which does not possess assured control over itself or over the nation. There are restless and fluid elements in public opinion among which the most restless and powerful is a group of social democrats. This group is now coöperating with other groups in supporting the existing government, but there are obvious signs of friction and the duration of coöperation is precarious. The socialist group tends to be revolutionary in its program and intolerant in spirit. It would be likely to object to a man of Mr. Root's antecedents, irrespective of any sympathy and understanding which he might have for Russia in its present predicament. For these reasons his appointment might lead to the occurrence of disagreeable incidents in Petrograd and compromise the success of the commission's work. It ought to be reconsidered.

IN legalizing conscription during the war by an overwhelming majority in both houses Congress has exhibited the common sense and the power of quick adjustment which in an emergency Americans can usually be depended on to exhibit. War is a rude and harsh business, and people who decide to wage war must follow up the decision with rude and harsh measures. The authorization of recruiting by compulsion is interpreted by one group as a triumph for democracy and by another as its irretrievable defeat. It is neither. Congress has not accepted the principle of universal military service; it has only adopted the expedient of a selective draft during war. As soon as the war is over the question as to how American armies are to be recruited will be reopened; and a new decision will have to be reached based upon international political conditions at that time and the enduring international responsibilities of the United States.

IN the meantime the effect of the adoption of such a dangerous expedient as conscription upon democracy in America will depend in part upon the political purposes for which the conscript army is ordered to fight, and in part upon the rigor with which the new law is administered. The provisions contained in the bill for exempting from service those individuals who have conscientious scruples against taking human life are unsatisfactory. They do not sufficiently prohibit the kind of brutality with which the conscientious objectors have been treated in Great Britain. It remains, consequently, for those who administer the law and ultimately for the Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, to take care that under its provisions no violence is done to any man who can prove by his affiliations and utterances the existence of a real scruple

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against killing human beings. Many extremely difficult cases will have to be adjusted under the law, particularly in the treatment of socialists who will resist and will attempt to capitalize politically any tendency to violence. Considering the existing state of public opinion great forbearance and tact will have to be used in order to prevent the administration of the law from arousing an ugly and vindictive popular opposition.

IN deciding whether and how soon American troops are to be sent to the fighting line this summer there are two questions to be considered, which should be kept separate. One of them concerns the advisability of sending any troops at all, except a brigade or two merely for moral effect. Before the French Commissioners arrived a decision had already been reached by the General Staff not to send any but a small body of troops during the present summer. The frank confession of extreme need for soldiers by the French Commissioners undoubtedly introduces a new element into the problem which may compel a reconsideration of the decision, but before the American government yields it must be satisfied that the attempted dispatch of several divisions of American soldiers to France will not carry with it the sacrifice of interests no less important than the French need of men. Certainly no Americans should be sent unless they are fully trained and hardened to the military and physical exigencies of trench warfare; and certainly they should not be sent unless they can be safely convoyed to the Continent. The idea of turning tramp steamers into transports and affording German submarines too easy a chance of sinking cargoes of American soldiers as well as of American food will not do. If, however, the soldiers can be adequately hardened for their work and transported to Europe with reasonable safety, and if such transportation can be carried on without taking tonnage away from more immediately essential service, there seems to be no reason why a larger body of troops than has been anticipated should not be dispatched to the front this summer.

ASSUMING that an attempt will be made to send several divisions rather than a brigade, the question as to what troops should be sent should be left to the General Staff without interference from Congress or public opinion. Its decision against a special body of soldiers recruited by Mr. Roosevelt should be considered final. There is no place in a modern army for a unit which draws to itself special attention, because it has been recruited by a popular hero and contains an exceptionally large number of prominent men. Such a division would attract an artificial and meretricious publicity, which would be wholly undesirable when serving in such a war as this—a war in which every unit and every individual does its job in silence and according to its ability and receives equal honor. The proposed Roosevelt division is conceived in the spirit of the old volunteer system rather than in the more silent and sober spirit of a professional or conscript army. If Mr. Roosevelt himself wants to go to the front he should, we think, be granted an opportunity in the shape of a general's commission. An ex-President is entitled in a time of crisis to serve in any kind of office which he wants and for which he is qualified. It would be a great waste to use a man of his ability and experience merely as a brigade commander, but that is for him to decide. As the chief of an ordinary unit in the American army stationed somewhere abroad he would take his place like a good soldier among the many almost anonymous minor leaders of the existing armies.

GERMAN figures of shipping sunk by submarines are most likely to err on the side of excess. The submarine commanders have good reason for making the most of their triumphs, and the government has still better reason for exaggeration. The ships sent to the bottom in the first two months probably fall considerably short of the 1,600,000 tons of Dr. Helfferich's figures. Nevertheless it is admitted on every hand that the volume of tonnage destroyed greatly exceeds the volume of new tonnage launched. It seems also to be true that the efficiency of the submarine is increasing. This must be due in part to the season. The submarine is most effective in daylight, and with the lengthening of the days more sinkings were to be expected. It seems not improbable, however, that the Germans are launching submarines faster than the British can sink them. Dr. Helfferich estimates that the British have still 7,000,000 to 10,000,000 tons available for purposes of trade, to be sunk before England will really be beaten. These are probably minimum figures. Moreover, by a shift in military plans some additional millions of tons of shipping could be returned to the work of provisioning England. The allied cause will not break down within many months for absolute want of shipping unless the submarines become much more effective than they have proved in the last three months.

NOW that the construction of wooden ships has been undertaken by the Shipping Board, there is an increasing tendency in certain technical and business circles to emphasize the superior advantages of ships constructed of steel. Nobody

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disputes the fact that a thousand steel ships would be worth more in war or in peace than a thousand wooden ships of equal capacity. If we build wooden ships, it is because our facilities for building steel ships are not equal to the supply of our pressing national needs. It is said that the steel shipbuilding plants could be so reorganized as greatly to increase their output. If this is true, every effort should be made to effect the reorganization at once. Perhaps we could manage to produce 200,000 tons a month instead of the 100,000 which now strain our facilities. But the Germans are sinking at least 600,000 tons a month. We have need of all the steel ships we can turn out, and of all the wooden ships too. And fortunately there is no reason why the one kind of tonnage should displace the other. The wooden ships require a kind of labor not wanted for steel shipbuilding and they can be built in yards improvised for the purpose, or at any rate not so situated as to be available for steel shipbuilding.

"BUSINESS as usual" is a motto now being widely employed to counteract the effect of President Wilson's recommendation of economy in private expenditures. If everybody resolves to make his old automobile run for another season, or to wear his last summer's suit, what will become of trade? We shall have a depression, so it is argued, with general unemployment and distress. What is here overlooked is that "business as usual" means the distribution of purchasing power, and ultimately of productive power, in the usual channels. But if we are to make war effectively, we must make a totally new distribution of purchasing power. More of our national income must go to soldiers and less to butlers and footmen, more money must be laid out on guns and ships and less on millinery and country places. This will be the natural effect of war taxation and of private subscriptions to government loans. Particular branches of trade will be hard hit. Quite possibly sporadic economy panics will depress some industries more than the national interest requires. There is, however, not the least danger that economy, voluntary or compulsory, will produce general depression. The expansion of necessary industries will take up all the slack.

IN Russia they tell a curious story of the schism in the Orthodox church. A long time ago certain prelates decided that the services of the church had become corrupted, and with great care revised them. New books were distributed everywhere. But conservatives objected to the change; the new books, they said, were too well printed to have come out of Russia—they must have been done in Venice by the hands of infidels. Therefore no true believer would use them. Thus began a bitter quarrel lasting through many years. The nearest approach to such dogmatic orthodoxy we have in America is among radical socialists. Their rituals about the class struggle, anti-nationalism and peace have in the past two years appeared sadly in need of refurbishing. An interesting new orientation has arisen. But certain high priests of orthodoxy will have none of it—it is too successful, it seems to have engaged practical support; therefore it bears a taint. They go on burning their incense before the pure and undefiled altars, while outside their shrines the old world tumbles and a new one arises. Government ownership and control of business, international mobilization of resources, expropriation of private wealth—all these things and more come into being. Meanwhile the priesthood of radicalism utters pious protest and suspects motives.

The World in Revolution

IT takes new eyes to see and new words to express what is going on to-day. The world is not only at war but in revolution as well. That revolution goes deeper than any man had dared to guess. The overturn in Russia, the intervention of America, the stirring of China, stupendous as they are, may be merely the prelude to events more drastic still. The whole world faces a famine of food, raw materials, shipping. The productivity of the earth is diminished, the destruction of capital is proceeding at a rate beyond the power of any one nation to repair it. If the worst calamity should happen and the war be prolonged beyond this year the feeding and refurnishing of the world will tax human ingenuity and science beyond anything of which the ordinary statesman has ever dreamed. Western civilization is approaching not the end of its potential resources, but the end of its resources as they are now organized.

This is the underlying meaning of the present conferences in Washington. The dread which hangs over them is of this shortage which will not end with the end of the war. The hope which inspires them is that the food, the shipping, the credit, and the basic materials of life can be pooled, jointly administered, fairly apportioned, and economically employed. Unless this is done the war cannot be conducted successfully nor a peace made without disaster.

It is almost impossible to estimate the consequences of this revolutionary situation. For one thing it means that a supernational government is being forced into existence—a world authority over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the necessities of life. National hoarding, whether of food or ships or materials, is becoming intolerable; economic nationalism, such as Germany practised and the Republican party preached, is being supplanted. We thought we had seen great things when countries like England were swept into national collectivism. We are witnessing greater things to-day in the birth of an international socialism of the commodities on which life depends.

The implications are by no means clear. But certain tentative conclusions it is possible to discern. The organization which we must now create to administer the vital supplies of the Alliance will persist after peace is established. It will control the resources of all the world except Central Europe. It will have become an economic as well as a military league of nations, and membership in it will be an absolute necessity. It is no longer an academic question as to whether Germany will be pleased to enter the League. Germany must enter it in order to be fed and supplied, in order that her industrial life may begin again.

In the last analysis a strong, scientific organization of the sources of material and access to them is the means to the achievement of the only purposes by which this war can be justified. The war started as an exhibition of ruthless nationalism, as an attempt by one nation to pursue its alleged destiny in defiance of the world. It is ending as an amalgamation of the world to defend itself by force, to feed and supply itself on a common basis. That full community has not yet been achieved, but the conference in Washington foreshadows a more statesmanlike continuation of the groping, not altogether enlightened and somewhat notorious Paris conference.

Only when this supernational economic control is established will the Alliance confront Germany with all its power mobilized. When such a control is established victory will take on a new meaning. It will not imply defeat such as Rome administered to Carthage, but readmission and absorption into the society of nations. In establishing this control we shall be following the evolution of a League of Nations. Economic association will precede political. The statutory machinery of the League will rest on an economic basis. It will crown and formalize an organization already in existence, an organization which draws its strength from the threat of famine and the utter need of security. The nations will approach the peace congress in an advanced state of economic internationalism, and the congress itself will be determined by this fact. That congress cannot finish its work in one session. We may well believe, therefore, that the League of Peace will be a continuation of the Congress of Peace. For, once the whole world is gathered in an assembly, the task of the internationalist will be to keep that assembly from dissolving.

Democracy in War Taxation

WAR taxation, boldly conceived and vigorously executed, means effective action in the conduct of the war. With the daily revenue receipts abundantly flowing, our statesmen will not have to withdraw their attention from the immediate problems of war to concentrate it upon the market, ready or reluctant to absorb new bond issues. Adequate war taxation means the simplification of the technical problem of securing men and materials for military use. Expensive luxuries will be sparingly purchased by men whose incomes have been closely pared by taxation. We shall have available mechanics and equipment to build motor lorries and tanks, in consequence of a flagging demand for limousines and racing cars. War taxation means the simplification of the fiscal problems of the period of reconstruction, when the government will need all its resources to combat the social lethargy and reaction that are likely to supervene. But this is not the chief meaning of war taxation. According as we prove wise and strong in our taxation policy, or weak and timid, we shall win or lose the substance of what we are fighting for. We are fighting for democracy, and democracy may be brilliantly victorious or crushingly defeated in the halls of Congress as well as on the plains east of Arras.

It is worth recalling some of the analogies presented by our own Civil War. That was a struggle for democracy, too. Free labor against the slave power, the farmers and laborers and small merchants of the North against the landed aristocracy of the South—can a clearer contrast of political and social forces be drawn? The democratic North crushed the aristocratic South. Democracy had won—on the surface. What was going on underneath the surface it is not so pleasant to recall. Inflated prices were steadily wearing away the standard of living of those who lived by labor. The workingman was driven to increased exertions by the lure of higher wages, while the content of purchasing power in his pay envelope grew steadily less. The farmer planted exultingly in the hope of good prices, to find at the harvest that the good prices were merely an illusion to make him work harder and involve himself more deeply in debt. But the army sutlers, the contractors at home, the organizers of industry, the speculators, floated joyously upon a sea of profits. This was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the time when the nuclei of the steel trust and the oil trust were impregnated with the germ of unlimited expansion. The "easy money" of the Civil War period and the mushroom fortunes and insatiate speculative spirit engendered by it laid the basis for most of the perplexities that harassed American politics for a generation. We beat the southern aristocracy, only to build up an oligarchy of finance and industry and speculation which for decades withstood all democratic assaults and which has not even yet been reduced to full submission to the democracy. No doubt the victory we won was worth more than its cost. But there was no need of incurring such a cost. It fell upon us unawares, because we did not know the meaning of inflation, nor the necessary connection between inflation and a weak policy of light or badly distributed taxation and heavy credit issues.

We know something of the meaning of inflation now, but we are not a vigilant people. We are convinced adherents of the doctrine that business prosperity signifies general wellbeing and national strength, and it is easy for this business interest or that, for one income class or another, to make a plausible plea, in the name of prosperity, against any drastic proposal of taxation. We are remote from the seat of war and must bring our force to bear chiefly through our industries: therefore we are likely to evince a hypersensitiveness to the inevitable plaints of industry that taxation is crippling our productive power. Seductive arguments for the policy of distributing burdens between the present and posterity will be unfolded before us. Equally seductive arguments for the wide diffusion of tax burdens through multiform consumption taxes will arrest our attention. We are patriots first and only secondarily democrats: shall we sacrifice national efficiency in the present crisis to considerations of domestic social organization?

There is no necessity for such a sacrifice. We can collect heavy excess profits taxes without discouraging industry. All that would inevitably be discouraged is speculation, of which we can't have too little in time of war. We can collect heavy taxes on large incomes without impairing industrial efficiency in any way. The same thing is true of inheritance taxes. Sums diverted from private recipients will not be withdrawn from industry. They will be spent not on luxurious consumption, but on objects of vital national concern.

We are not engaged in war because we regard the German people as our natural enemies. We conceive of the German people as subject to a baleful anti-democratic organization that threatens to extend its influence, by contagion as it were, over the rest of the world. Anti-democratic forces are indeed more strongly entrenched in Germany than in any other occidental state. They do, in fact, menace the happiness of the occident, if not that of the whole world. To overthrow them is worth any sacrifice except the sacrifice of democracy at home. If we do not look sharply to our war finance democracy will win no unambiguous victory, even if Germany is beaten.

In France

EVERY nation, if only one could be kept alive in the world, would choose itself for preservation, but the second choice of most nations would be France. We, in this country, admire her for many things, and most of all for the humanity, in the old sense, of French life. In spite of the heavy weight of the obligation to military service, her citizens have enjoyed a liberty as great as ours. And in no other country is the sense of equality so widespread and so civilized. French equality has survived even the industrial revolution, and the new consciousness which has followed it, of the difference between being rich and being poor. Differences in fortune, in leisure, in command of one's own time, are in every country hard enough for sufferers under them to bear, and for disinterested observers to see. It is in France that such differences have done least to poison human intercourse, to make the relation of one human being to another unnatural or uneasy, to lessen most companionableness in which France has long been first.

What France has lost in killed and wounded is not accurately known except to members of her government, to her military leaders, and to a few other men. France does not publish her losses. But everything we have heard in this country, from vague rumor to the reports of the most careful neutral observers, has strengthened our fear that in proportion to her population France was losing more heavily than any other large nation engaged in the war. We have been afraid that deaths and wounds would exhaust her before peace came, that the work of becoming again the France of the old days would prove too great even for her extraordinary recuperative power.

The French envoys now in this country have wisely chosen not to hide from us the same fear that is in their own hearts. They are ready to help us by telling what France has learned to do and not to do in almost three years of war; they are grateful; they hope that with our aid the war may the sooner come to a just ending. But they say to us, in words whose plain implication cannot be misunderstood, that although France needs food and ships to carry it, her greatest need is more soldiers. Thus the fear we had when our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knowledge was imperfect is justified by the words of these men who know.

By the extremity of France's need we can estimate the greatness of her sacrifices. We are better able than before to realize what she has lost in quantity of lives. That she would endure to the end we have always known, but no one will ever know the cost of that endurance in quality of lives, no imagination can grasp the multitude of individual hopes unfulfilled, of gifts extinguished, of clear minds turned into nothingness before their special work was half finished or even begun. When a nation goes to war she sends her young men first, because they are strong, because her enemies do the same, and also because, as we say, they have still their place to make in the world. We forget, perhaps, that those who have still their places to make in the world are those most likely to better the world by remaking it. But France has not sent her young men only. She has sent them all, young and older, up to the age when the body is not strong enough for war, and she is losing them all. The world is in danger of losing the France it has admired and loved, though without quite understanding characteristics which would have been contradictory in a less versatile nation—the France of order and labor and light-hearted seriousness, of mockery and family pieties, of the experimental mind and respect for tradition, the France where no learning is too complicated to be arranged with clearness, no thought too profound to be put into simple words, where love of clearness is a part of morality, a form of self-respect.

The Morality of Conscription

THE habit of thinking in absolutes has led the debate on conscription into strange paths. We are told that conscription is based on the principle of equality of sacrifice. Yet in the same breath we are informed that the first draft is to consist of less than half of one per cent of the population. There is no equality of burden about it. It is not an equal obligation of citizenship. Women are exempt, the middle-aged and elderly are exempt, the physically unfit are exempt. All sorts of agricultural, industrial, scientific and administrative workers will be exempt, married men will probably be exempt in the first draft at least. Yet mature people with a straight face speak of equality.

Thereupon the anti-conscriptionist, seeing through the humbug of equality, proceeds to idealize the humbug of free will in the volunteer system. That a percentage of men will enlist freely is undoubtedly true, but to these men the legal compulsion is not coercive. They have not lost their free will because they freely wish to do what the government compels them to do. But these men are only a portion of those who are recruited under volunteering. The rest are hypnotized, cajoled, shamed, and stung into volunteering.

The real issue narrows itself down to three classes of men: those who can be bullied into volunteering, those who have conscientious objections to military service, and those who do not know whether it is their duty to enlist. That this third class gains peace of mind by conscription there can be no doubt, and it is a very large class. In a war of the kind we are now fighting the number of people who serve behind the line of fire is much larger than those who actually face the enemy. Under the volunteer system these men are exposed to the taunt of slacker and to constant conscientious doubt as to whether they are slackers. Conscription abolishes their moral difficulties. It also abolishes them for those who would otherwise have been bullied sooner or later into volunteering.

Where conscription bears heavily is upon those who do not wish to fight under any circumstances. This class is mixed. It includes the true conscientious objectors who are so radically opposed to war that they will endure death or imprisonment rather than take part in it. They are very brave men and their sincerity is proved by their unwillingness to accept alternative service of any kind. With the chance to do safe and respected work they still prefer the danger of standing out for their conviction. They are a precious element in any society, and conscription which does not respect them is being brutally administered. But the class of those who do not wish to fight is larger than that of the moral heroes. It contains the real slackers who are more afraid of the danger and hardships of war than of social ostracism. But it contains also men whose nerves are not strong enough, men to whom war is so terrible that it fills them with panic. These men are bound to suffer inordinately under conscription. They are not easy to exempt, and few people in a state of patriotic exaltation would be generous enough to wish them exempted. They are not sustained by the religious or political idealism of the conscientious objector. Under the volunteer system they are able to hide and escape the storm of war. Conscription takes them—they are the margin of sheer tragedy which it involves.

Wisely administered conscription would altogether exempt the conscientious objector and would provide alternative service for those who cannot bear the horror of war. In the last analysis it is these two groups of men, the heretics and the nervously defective, who require special treatment under conscription. They are the only ones who suffer by the abandonment of volunteering. To

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them alone does compulsion make a vital difference. Balancing their loss we may set down the elimination of the imbecilities and compulsions of a recruiting campaign, the escape from uncertainty among all men of military age.

In accepting conscription we turn over the moral decision from the individual and his group to the men who are in charge of the war. We accept almost absolute dictatorship. We put this awful power into the hands of men who happen to control the state. It would be mere cant to sentimentalize this as democracy or equality. The engine of conscription is autocratic, unfair, and ruthless. It gives some men the power to select other men for terrible sacrifices.

Ugly as it is, nothing is gained by fighting conscription itself, for the alternative is no less ugly and infinitely more wasteful. Conscription is a weapon, like the machine gun and the torpedo, a weapon of war. War may be waged in defense of equality and democracy, in behalf of peace and order. But the method and logic of war is violent and autocratic, and it is always an interruption and a suspension of the more voluntary and liberal processes of life. When a democracy goes to war, it is compelled for the emergency to lay aside much of its own character.

When men say that Prussian militarism is a menace to them they do not mean that Prussia is about to conquer the United States. They mean that a triumphant Prussia would keep men in such a state of apprehension that they would be compelled to imitate Prussia in order to feel secure. Therefore it is no surprise to find that in resisting Prussia we too are forced to adopt much of the machinery which has made her militarism great. We live in the faith that if her militarism can be discredited Germany will in turn adopt the spirit which makes democracy tolerant.

The problem of conscription comes down finally to the question of whether it was right to meet Germany with force. For once you accept the premise that war against Germany was necessary, the difference between conscription and volunteering is merely between more and less compulsory, more and less burdensome, more and less wasteful methods of conducting that war.

Whether war against Germany was wise will not be finally settled until the peace conference is over. The decision to enter the war was a decision to embrace a great opportunity. The courage, the effectiveness, the wisdom, and the justice with which we can use that opportunity is still to be shown. We have adopted the most terrible means known to man to accomplish one of the greatest ends ever offered to man. We have still to see whether we can make the end justify the means.

Strange News from Russia

ON Wednesday, April 25th, American newspapers carried a despatch from Russia telling of a hostile demonstration before the American Embassy in Petrograd. According to the New York Times, the outburst was "said to have been due to the alleged killing in America of an anarchist named Mooney." On the following day, the State Department at Washington gave out part of a detailed report from Ambassador Francis explaining that an Italian anarchist had inflamed the crowd in Nevsky Prospect "by stating that an Italian named Muni had been executed in the United States." Through these vague reports millions of Americans had their attention called for the first time to one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of the American labor movement.

Thomas J. Mooney is neither an Italian nor an anarchist, but an American citizen and an organizer of labor in San Francisco. Last February, he was sentenced to the gallows. On the 12th of April, almost two weeks before the despatch from Russia, the San Francisco Bulletin published documentary evidence tending to show that he had been convicted on perjured testimony. Within a few days, the trial judge instructed the district attorney to take cognizance of the new evidence, thus preparing the way for a new trial. These revelations stirred the world of labor as deeply as the confessions of the McNamaras had stirred the business world in 1911. Only the situation was reversed. Instead of front page stories, the newspapers kept such complete silence that two weeks after the exposure of the evidence upon which Mooney had been convicted, even the State Department appears to have remained in total darkness as to the facts.

The labor unions of San Francisco are among the strongest in the country. For many years their control of the local labor market has been bitterly resented by their employers. On July 10th, 1916, at a mass meeting called by the Chamber of Commerce, a Law and Order Committee was formed to "stamp out the disease." Within a few days, one million dollars were subscribed to make San Francisco an open-shop town.

Meanwhile, the Chamber of Commerce had been actively promoting a preparedness parade for the 22nd of July. The labor unions, alleging that the Chamber had issued intimidating orders that "all employees in San Francisco must march," officially refused to have anything to do with the "employers' preparedness parade." During the parade, a bomb was dropped from a roof along the line of march. Six onlookers were killed and more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than two score injured, some of them fatally. The police began an investigation, apparently on the theory that the outrage had been committed by a German sympathizer or by an irresponsible maniac. " But suddenly," according to the attorney for the defense, " about two hours later in the same afternoon, one Martin Swanson, a private detective employed by the United Railways Company, appeared upon the scene and at once assumed control of all proceedings connected with the catastrophe."

The Law and Order Committee of the Chamber of Commerce held another mass meeting, at which leaders in the business community are reported to have called upon the citizenship to unite in stamping out the " rule of the associated agitators, criminals and criminal apologists." A number of labor leaders were arrested and indicted for murder. One of these was Israel Weinberg, member of the Executive Board of the Jitney Bus Operators' Union, " a live organization which has competed with the United Railroads street cars very successfully, taking in prodigious amounts in five-cent fares." Another was Thomas J. Mooney, who had come into prominence as the organizer of a strike on the lines of the United Railways Company. Before Mooney's trial, the district attorney's office gave out a statement implying that he was one of a group of labor leaders who had entered into a conspiracy to subvert our entire political system by assassinating President Wilson, Governor Johnson and other important officials, state and national. The bomb explosion was said to have grown out of this conspiracy. Patriotism was invoked to reënforce the cry of Law and Order in inflaming the public mind against the defendant. The labor unions of San Francisco rallied to Mooney's support. Contributions to his defense fund came from organizations as far removed as Holland. After his conviction, mass meetings of protest were held in Chicago, New York and other American cities.

The principal witness against Mooney was a certain Oregon cattleman, named Oxman, who testified that he had seen the defendants in Weinberg's jitney at the time and place of the bomb explosion. His evidence was contradicted, not only by the fact that the police had taken extraordinary precautions to keep all traffic from the line of march, but also by photographs taken by onlookers, which, when enlarged, showed Mooney and his wife, who was indicted with him, on the top of a building more than a mile away within a minute or two of the time when the explosion occurred. Nevertheless, Oxman's testimony served to secure a jury verdict under which Mooney was to have been hanged on the 17th of May.

On the 12th of April, the San Francisco Bulletin published photographic reproductions of letters attributed to Oxman which, according to the Bulletin, proved that he had deliberately lied and that throughout the preparation of the case against Mooney he had received money from some unrevealed source with which to buy witnesses to corroborate his own falsified testimony. These letters were addressed to F. E. Rigall of Grayville, Illinois, whose family Oxman had once befriended. In them, Oxman appealed to Rigall to come to San Francisco as " a Expurt witness in a very important case. You will only hafto answer 3 or 4 questions and I will post you on them. You will get mileage and all that a witness can draw. Probly 100 in the clear."

Ignorant of the purpose for which he was wanted, Rigall says that he went to San Francisco and became the guest of Oxman and the district attorney's office. According to his story, he was taken to the scene of the bomb explosion, coached in the answers he was expected to make from the witness stand to the prosecuting attorney, and given extraordinary opportunities to see the defendant so that he might not fail to identify him in court. When Rigall protested that he had been in Niagara Falls, New York, on the day of the preparedness parade, Oxman is said to have assured him that that made no difference, that inasmuch as there was a large reward which, as a result of their joint efforts, would be divided between them, he had better " come through." Moreover, in a sworn statement, Rigall affirms that " Cuhna [the assistant district attorney in charge of the trial] told me that this case meant much to him; that he was a young man and that this case would mark his advance or failure. That if the case could be won, Fickert [the district attorney] could be elected governor and that he could succeed to Fickert's place."

" No sane man," says the San Francisco Bulletin of April 12th, " can doubt that Oxman testified falsely. . . . The police department and the District Attorney's office are on trial." But the larger significance of the case to the world of labor is revealed in a despatch to a New York evening paper stating that the charges now are " that the state's prosecutors, backed by the Chamber of Commerce, were railroading labor leaders to the hangman in order to end unionism in San Francisco."

This is the Thomas J. Mooney, an American citizen, whose sentence so deeply stirred the indignation of the workers who had recently overthrown a Czar. In commenting upon the strange news from Russia, the New York Times said: " The Mooney referred to in the above despatch

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

probably is Thomas J. Mooney, who is under sentence of death for connection with the bomb explosion in San Francisco in July, 1916." The Times, like all other eastern papers, had apparently heard nothing of the new evidence that had caused a sensation in San Francisco almost two weeks earlier. Is it not a remarkable commentary upon the attitude of the American press toward labor that one of the most significant and dramatic events in the history of organized labor in America should have come to the attention of American newspaper readers through a mass meeting in the Nevsky Prospect?

Children in War

AT the beginning of the war England rushed children into industry in a frantic attempt to increase her industrial output, put a premium on child labor by paying enormous wages to children, suspended restrictions on hours of labor in certain industries, let her schools shift for themselves while she attended to other matters, and interrupted most of her child welfare work. All of that was very natural. What mattered but war? Why shouldn't the children do their bit? But when the war developed into an endurance test in which the physical fitness and productivity of every one was increasingly valuable, it began to look as if the children's bit was something more than an immediate sacrifice. One has only to read the reports of the British Committee on Health of Munition Workers and Cecil Leeson's The Child and the War to understand England's partial return to restricted hours of labor, regulated child labor, the enforcement of school laws, and the stimulation of child welfare work after the irregularities of the earlier days of the war.

The Committee on Health of Munition Workers said of juvenile employment in particular: "Very young girls show almost immediately . . . symptoms of lassitude, exhaustion, and impaired vitality under the influence of employment at night. A very strong similar impression was made . . . by the appearance of large numbers of young boys who had been working at munitions for a long time on alternate night and day shifts. . . . A social worker . . . stated that, so far as he knew, there was no general breakdown, but then he did not expect to see immediate effects. . . . He suggested, however, that the boys were drawing on their strength . . . and he was very anxious to know what would become of the boys after the war. . . . *At the present time when the war is destroying so much of its best manhood, the nation is under special obligation to secure that the rising generation grows up strong and hardy both in body and character. It is necessary to guard not only against immediate breakdown, but also against the imposition of strains which may stunt future growth and development.*" The Committee recommended that the hours of labor of boys under sixteen and girls under eighteen be kept within sixty a week, that boys under sixteen and girls under eighteen be employed at night only if other labor could not be obtained, that Sunday work be stopped, and that there be careful supervision of the welfare of all workers, especially children. In short, the conclusion was that even in a great emergency it is extravagant to overwork and underdevelop your labor force. It is interesting in this connection to note that France has gone even further than England, having prohibited in June, 1916, night work by girls under eighteen, and recommended that girls between eighteen and twenty-one be employed at night only in exceptional cases and temporarily. . .

It is hard to estimate how many children the Health of Munition Workers Committee's recommendations affected. We are told that in May, 1916, 15,753 children had been formally exempted from school to go to work and that in 1915 probably 45,000 children between twelve and fifteen in excess of the usual number (450,000) left school for work with or without formal permission, while between 150,000 and 200,000 children of eleven and twelve are said to have gone into industry. Most of the younger children appear to be working on farms, but there is no possible way of estimating the actual number in munition works. That the health of munition workers, however, is not England's only problem is clear from Cecil Leeson's analysis of the reasons for the increase of juvenile delinquency during the war. "Had we set out with the deliberate intention of manufacturing juvenile delinquents," he said, "could we have done so in any more certain way?" Many schools were taken over for military purposes; about 300,000 little children five years old or under who had been in school were turned out by a change in school age limits; the children excused from school to go to work found themselves dropped suddenly into a world of high wages and little supervision; the work of clubs and settlements was practically at a standstill; city streets were darkened; the police force was reduced; home discipline, with fathers at the front and mothers in munition factories, was lax; and "the war spirit" was abroad. What could one expect? "Even for adults," commented Mr. Leeson, "the world of the moment is a harder place to dwell in than it was two years ago; it is not likely to be less hard for inexperienced children from whom guidance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is withheld." And juvenile delinquency in the country as a whole increased 34 per cent in 1915, while in Manchester alone it increased 56 per cent, and in Edinburgh, 46 per cent.

All of this, of course, has a moral for us. Our characteristic belief in our national ability to do things better than anyone else is likely to mislead us in this instance to feel that no matter what happens we shall not misuse our children. There is no need of dwelling here on the sad tale of our past performances in child protection and development. Only the other day Dr. S. Josephine Baker, of the New York Bureau of Child Hygiene, said that fifteen out of every one hundred children in New York City suffer from malnutrition—in times of peace. What, she asked, will become of them in war? Almost a year before we entered the war, Connecticut munition manufacturers had discovered that the state law prohibiting night work for women and minors was as full of holes as a sieve, and so had proceeded to employ their women and girls, many of them between sixteen and twenty-one, on the night shift, from six-thirty at night to four-thirty in the morning, or, on the overtime schedule, until five. If that is peace, what will war be?

Immediately after our declaration of war the newspapers were filled with schemes for increasing our labor supply, most of which involved the use of children. Someone in Pennsylvania wanted the places of miners who enlist taken by fourteen-year-old boys. Someone in New Jersey suggested that the schools close for two months to allow the children to be sent to work on farms. In the New York legislature there is a bill, which is receiving serious consideration, to suspend all restrictions on the hours of labor of women and minors during the war. Probably all these suggestions are made in good faith. Probably a good many people believe that to hurry our children into factories, mines, and fields in this emergency and work them unlimited hours would be to give them the privilege of performing a great patriotic service. Indeed those who, like the National Child Labor Committee, have the temerity to suggest that children ought not to be so misused, are too often met with the indignant reply, "Why shouldn't the children help? In war everyone must do his part!" True—everyone must do his part. But what is the children's part?

If the war were guaranteed to end in three months, we might possibly be justified in flinging every man, woman, and child recklessly into service to hurry the finish. But we have no such guaranty. Some of us feel the Allies' spring offensive is encouraging; some of us believe there may be a revolution in Germany any day; and some of us feel simply that "something is going to happen." Unfortunately we have been feeling for three years that something is going to happen and nothing has happened. If we are wise we shall settle ourselves for a long fight. And since the war is likely to be more industrial than military, so far as we are concerned, one of the first things we do must be to adapt our labor force to war conditions and assure ourselves of an inexhaustible supply of labor for the years to come. Is overworking and neglecting our children now, assuring ourselves of that labor supply? If we adopt sane, selective recruiting and intelligently fill the places of enlisted men with women and older boys and girls, we shall face no immediate labor shortage. As for the younger children, we should conserve and develop them just as carefully as Mr. Hoover is going to conserve and develop our food supply. If we are wise and farsighted we shall enforce child labor laws and school laws more rigidly than ever just now. We shall scrutinize and regulate every single use of children in industry, for there must be nothing headless, in this emergency, about our use of human resources. More than that, we shall stimulate educational activity, especially in industrial training, and support as never before public and private child welfare agencies, if we are going to make the most of the material we have in hand. In short, we must protect, train, and develop children now for the simple reason that for the future, both remote and immediate, we need a more intelligent and able-bodied set of people than ever. "The nation is under special obligation to secure that the rising generation grows up strong and hardy both in body and character," is the solemn warning of England, which has been at war for three years, to America on the threshold of war.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1917, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY WALTER LIPPMANN
PHILIP LITTELL FRANCIS HACKETT
ALVIN JOHNSON
GEORGE SOULE—Assistant Editor

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE.

REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Public Finance

WITHOUT misgivings, without even raising the question of precedent, Congress has placed the financial power of the nation at the disposal of our allies. We have begun to file away the unsecured notes of foreign nations in the portfolios of our public treasury, and we are looking forward complacently to a great accumulation of assets of the kind. Not many months ago, when Carranza first arrived in Mexico City, master of the situation but for his want of money, all that our government could do in the way of supporting the new political order was to recommend it to the mercies of the private bankers of Wall Street. The bankers did not like the security offered, and the Mexican revolution had to proceed in the devious and painful way of unlimited paper issues and confiscation and disorder. Yet Carranza was our official candidate for power. The prompt pacification of Mexico fell clearly within the scope of our national interest. Fifty millions or a hundred millions would have made the progress of pacification swift and sure, and our treasury could have raised the money overnight. But we never thought of a public loan to Carranza. International private finance we understood, but international public finance fell quite without the range of our political imagination. And now suddenly we plunge into international public finance, not to the extent of a few hundred millions, but with three billions as a preliminary transaction.

We have merely caught up with the world. Since the outbreak of the war England has been making loans without stint, to Russia, Italy and Belgium. English financial power has served also to support the credit of France. Germany has loaned colossal sums to the Dual Empire, Bulgaria and Turkey. And now the United States will soon have assumed the rôle of creditor of England, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium. If Latin-American states enter the war, we are likely to find compelling reasons for extending loans to them as well.

It is a commonplace that the international private finance of the ante-bellum period entailed important political consequences. The investment of French savings in Russian bonds, German private investments in Turkey created relations of amity between states such as could not otherwise have subsisted. The political complications produced by international private financing in Latin-America, Morocco and the Orient are notorious. Are we to suppose that the new system of international public finance will remain without political consequences? This is impossible.

If the war continues for twelve months we shall probably have loaned our allies five billions of dollars. On this sum the annual interest charge will be two hundred millions, at least. Every year until the principal is paid we shall look for remittances from abroad, to cover the interest payments we must make to our citizens who have provided the capital loaned by our government. Our treasury department will no longer be able to confine its calculations to domestic conditions. So long as the foreign remittances flow in regularly, our treasury will serve merely as intermediary between the foreign debtor states and our private bond holders. But suppose that for any reason the debtor states fail to pay. Our government will have to make up the deficit out of taxation. And thus the general body of taxpayers will come to a realization of the solidarity of the nations implied in international public finance.

Can there, however, be the slightest doubt that the debtor nations will observe scrupulously their obligations to us? They will pay if they possibly can. But every nation will issue from the war heavily encumbered with domestic obligations not less sacred than those of an international character. Pensions for the maimed and disabled can not be omitted, nor can the helpless dependents of the slain be left to beggary. Where the domestic indebtedness is widely distributed among all classes of the population, as it is in most of the countries at war, the interest must be paid under penalty of general distress and disorder. Whether a country can meet both its domestic and its foreign obligations will depend upon the vigor with which it resumes the work of peaceful production. If it is cramped for funds for the rehabilitation of industry and sinks into prolonged depression, the full observance of all the obligations resting upon it may become impossible. Whether it will then give precedence to foreign obligations is uncertain. It is not likely to do so if the result would be serious disturbances at home.

Thus our entry into the field of international public finance exposes us to tangible loss from industrial depression in other countries and gives us a tangible interest in their prosperity. Our budget itself emerges from its traditional national isolation. For the present our government is indeed restricted by law to the extending of loans to the nations at war, and it may not extend loans after the war has come to an end. It is supposed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that with peace we shall abandon the rôle of public lender to the nations. But we may be compelled to revise our intentions in this matter. Not peace alone, but rehabilitation of industry, is essential to the security of our international investment. Belgium, Russia and Italy, and possibly France also, will need vast sums of capital to put their industrial powers into prompt operation. If we have the capital to lend, we shall probably be forced to recognize that the community of interest created by war can not be immediately dissolved by peace.

International public finance dowers us with a pressing and tangible interest in the prosperity of the nations with which we are allied. The enjoyment of secure peace by those nations becomes an even more pressing interest of ours. If the present war concludes with an unsatisfactory settlement, to be followed by a desperate competition in armaments and a war vaster and more terrible than the present, we may as well write off to total loss the three billions we are lending and the many additional billions we are likely to lend in the future. We are staking these sums on our hope of a saner international order. At any time in the next three decades let war clouds grow heavy over Europe, and every income taxpayer in the United States may as well prepare to economize. Shall we again hear the assertion, current three years ago, that with European embroilments we have nothing to do? Shall we again listen deferentially to the so-called hard headed business man who declares that war means good times? We have in the past developed vested interests in war and preparations for war. Our venture in international public finance is creating a far more extensive, far more sensitive vested interest in peace.

This venture is creating a vested interest also in the character of foreign governments. And might not this lead to a financial Holy Alliance of the creditor nations, to repress revolutionary popular movements in the debtor countries? The governments to which we shall extend loans are not autocracies, capable of being upset in a day and replaced by totally antagonistic forms of authority. They rest upon a broad basis of popular consent. Some of them may indeed give way under stress of revolution to governments still more democratic. Such an outcome would be worth the loss of a mere investment. That it would entail such loss is, however, improbable. Democracy has established itself as of all forms of government the most scrupulous of the national honor. The interests we are promoting by our loans are national interests, not those of any particular government. The obligation is therefore one that no government fairly representative of the nation would voluntarily repudiate. With our budget heavily engaged in the fortunes of foreign nations we can not view changes in the governments of those nations with indifference. But every change in the direction of democracy falls to our advantage, and democracy manifestly points the direction of current political evolution.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

Art and Common Sense

THE first independent show in New York is exceedingly successful in the presentation of pictures, and these are fairly up to the mark of reasonable expectation. Some persons express astonishment at not finding any novelties of extraordinary importance, but if they stopped to think they might be astonished at their own expectations. The fact of an independent exhibition is after all merely occasion for presentation to an audience of things that already exist. The independents have offered in the Grand Central Palace a well hung, well lighted collection which by virtue of its very miscellaneousness is stimulating and amusing. No pictures are skied, there is on the whole little crowding, and the accidental juxtapositions of mutually repellent particles does more good than harm. It helps to make one notice things. In the tranquillity of the home a modest reticence may be an ideal, but pictures are hung in exhibitions in order that they may be seen. For the obtaining of this end accident seems to be far more efficacious than deliberate intention, and in this show the pictures are more interestingly in evidence than in any other large exhibition that I have visited.

As I walked about the pleasant cool galleries I thought of various things, and most especially of what the modern artist is driving at, whether he is on the right road, and whether it is desirable that he should be encouraged in his present aims and tendencies. What evidence is there of well directed effort; and if the effort is not well directed, what is the explanation?

That the effort is not satisfactorily directed is highly probable. There is a great deal in the show that is pleasantly ordinary, but insufficiently accomplished. On the other hand there is too much originality that is not original, and there is far too much personal expression that is neither very personal nor very expressive. One sees more evidence of the conviction of genius than evidence of its presence. I mean that there is more proof that painters believe in the value of their message because it is theirs, than because they have proof,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in its effect on others, that the message is of value. It is as though in other fields of industry, in invention, manufacture or distribution, products or methods should be temperamentally rated rather than in accordance with their suitability to serve some end. Our painters have lost all sense of purpose other than that of satisfying their individual desire, and regard a public demand as a mere impertinence. In consequence they wander in a quagmire of uncertainties led only by the will-o'-the-wisps of their most questionable genius, and hope for profit from the bulldozing of a public too timid to insist upon its rights and too nervous to trust to its own judgment.

In the good old days this was not so. Then there were portrait painters and still-life painters and painters of religious subjects and landscapes. There were painters who would paint anything that they were paid to paint. Old Ghirlandaio would refuse no commission whether it was for the painting of a barn or a crucifixion. He very sensibly regarded painting as a business. The painter was a craftsman producing an article for which there was a greater or less demand. His personal expression was an incident. He did not even purposely have one, but only because he could not help it. If his personal note was slight or negligible he was what we now call "school," producing like a more or less honest man the kind of thing that some greater and inevitably original man had put in circulation. His was a useful even if not a glorious career.

This notion of providing for a given market as in any other industry and of producing as well as possible an article for which there is a demand, is frowned upon to-day in the world of art and is regarded as the surrender of the lofty ideals that should animate the artist. Somehow or other because a man happens to have a gift for painting pictures rather than for designing furniture or automobiles he is supposedly obliged to hitch his wagon to a star. No star may be in sight, but he must find, or, in the last extremity, invent one. To do his duty he must "express" himself, and it is no concern of his how infinitesimal or negligible may be the self that comes to expression.

This attitude seems to me altogether wrong. There is not the slightest presumption in favor of an individual soul because it happens to annex a talent for statement with a brush. The soul may be indeed the most insignificant of souls; and an extended acquaintance with artists has convinced me that they do not average any higher than other people, that not one out of scores has anything to say that is peculiarly worth saying, and that a thorough knowledge of the business of painting, with a readiness to say the thing that someone is interested to hear, would be more consonant with their talents and with the general situation in which they find themselves. The world's great painters were not trying to do something unusual any more than the great inventors, scientists or business men. They were trying to meet a situation, not to create one. The rigmarole of self-expression is a delusion; the only valuable self-expression is that which one cannot help. That is the self-expression of the formative imagination which makes its own original mould because its creative energy is such as to transform any mould it happens to employ. The reason it cannot be merely "school" is because it has grown to a stature beyond the measure of existing types, not because it has deliberately avoided them.

In much of modern art there has been exactly this avoidance. It is because of his example in this course that Picasso has been typically disastrous in his influence. Picasso had in most exaggerated form an egotism that rejected rivalry. His talent really was immense and his facility unlimited. Although he had no deep originality, no essentially fresh formal impulse, he none the less gave to all the matter of his sensitive and prehensile observation, the special imprint of his personality. Yet all this did not content him. He was jealous—of Cézanne especially. He aimed to rival Cézanne's massive form and held lightly his own endless and intelligent capacity for illustration. In order to give the impression of more mass he made his drawings bigger, simplifying and enlarging the curves. Of course the essential mass was thereby unaffected. He strained his deformations to get more force of volume expression. He did not get it, for unfortunately this kind of feeling comes by grace, not works. At last his distortion led him away entirely from representation, and only when the comparison with Cézanne was evaded by the reduction of volumes to formal symbols was he satisfied. He could then believe in the reality of his delusive triumph, for there were no longer any terms of comparison. He had then started on the dangerous road where he could take his endless ingenuity for genius, and he exploited it to the full. He had real genius too, and this gave to the inventions of his ingenuity a glamour that disguised their basic futility. For years now he has traded on this ingenuity and its rapidly succeeding inventions constitute the main lines in the history of cubism.

This confusion of ingenuity with self-expression has been the characteristic vice of contemporary art, for it has tended to make the artist try to find something to say rather than to find some way of saying it. He has ignored eye-sight in favor of invention. He no longer took the thing before

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him as the point of origin for his developments, because the thing before him was commonplace compared to the potentialities of his speculative intelligence. He had, to be sure, come to the conclusion that the only real integral reality that would truly express him was something that should well out of him spontaneously, but as it generally did not well, he helped it out with theoretic constructions, and in some cases even thought to build it up essentially on theory. But in so doing he assumed the possession of an intelligence far in excess of the one he actually had. Most painters have very moderate intelligence, and the inventions that they have latterly made to give an outlet to the ego that to them seemed struggling for utterance have been pathetic in their vacuous futility. It is indeed striking that the only painter of really superior intelligence that I have ever known, that is, Matisse, would have none of this and was content to strive merely for expression. He always knew the thing he wanted to say though he often had to struggle terribly to get it said. He did not have to bother about his integrity because for him as for all other honest laborers the job was definitely before him. The other men who, unlike him, were so constantly concerned to be themselves at any cost, were driven in most cases to invented conceits which were mere delusive substitutes for genuine expression.

Indeed, the modern artist's painful solicitude concerning his integrity is one of the comical features of the current scene. He is quite endlessly concerned to find his soul instead of letting his soul find itself. He has, as it were, to stimulate his soul to its own unique endeavor even when his soul shows no spontaneous tendency that way. Impatiently he helps it out with ingenious inventions which though often admirably curious are in substance pathetically trivial. He is so serious in intention that he becomes less than frivolous in execution. For his own salvation he needs absolutely to come down from his exalted pedestal and recognize himself for the quite ordinary person that he commonly is.

The fact is that integrity is in no peculiar sense his province, and he requires it in just exactly the same way as every other man. The business man who swindles with false advertisements, the lawyer who confounds justice with chicane, the promoter who inveigles innocent men with lying prospectuses are lacking in integrity in exactly the same sense as a painter or any other workman who does not do an honest job. But just as a dealer can without question of his integrity sell a sound article, even when he has not determined his predestination to just that identical operation, so may a painter paint a picture simply to satisfy a customer without consideration of a soul cast into outer darkness. Predestined men there are, but they should prove it by trying to be simple, and by yielding only to an "urge" that irresistibly drives them along paths remote from common men, instead of doing as the modern artist so persistently does: wilfully seeking a peculiar expression, which often is nothing but the evidence of vagueness and insufficient purpose.

The painter is, then, doing his sufficient duty if he paints the best picture that he can in order to afford entertainment to the spectator. He cannot gain if he insists on lifting himself by his own bootstraps. His straining postures may for the moment delude the observer into a belief in his elevation, but it will not take very long to prove the ascension a make-believe. It will be better for the painter to be great incidentally than to be great on purpose.

LEO STEIN.

Briggs Is Briggs

TO what extent will Briggs take part in the war? That is the question which thousands have been asking lately. It cannot be answered yet awhile. In the New York Tribune three weeks ago he showed us a small spy confronting a firing squad not much older. Then came the picture of Jones, refusing to let his son enlist, exasperated by the importance of men whose sons had enlisted, very chesty at last when he discovered that his son had disobeyed him and gone in. Later on Briggs showed us the eastern coast line of the United States, beset by periscopes, with Uncle Sam trying to patrol it, all by himself, from Florida to Maine. When a Feller Needs a Million Friends, the cartoon was called. It does not tell us how deeply Briggs will get involved in the war. It does prove that he can get more or less involved without taking the joy out of life.

But one great change will come over Briggs if he decides to go in all the way. Look again at the above-mentioned pictures of Jones. What makes them so different? Isn't it the presence of Jones's son, a youth of twenty or so? If Briggs goes in there will be many pictures of youths about this age, and what he has mostly shown us is boys, a few girls, and persons grown up enough to be the mothers, fathers and teachers of such girls and boys. The war may force his hand, may compel him to annex adolescence as a subject province.

Hitherto he has let adolescence pretty much alone. This girl, who probably resents her high sled as a badge of shame, marking her off from the real coasters, the males, and who would re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sent it less if her mother's voice did not rub the shame in by forbidding her to coast bellybumps—this girl drops out of Briggs's world when she is fourteen or fifteen. We do not meet her again until she has become a mother, taking her offspring out of games, sentencing him to clean clothes and dancing lessons, while his playmates hoot at him derisively, or condemning him to chores. Or we see her as Friend Wife, and recognize the way of a wife with a home. She has laughed at her husband, for days she cannot help laughing when he falls out of bed, she has brought distress upon him and visited him with affliction and other visitors. Hers is the unceasing voice that drives her husband out of the house to his club, where he sits alone in a large room, the daily paper in hand, a bell within reach, drinking highballs, solitude and silence.

She has much to endure from her husband. Grumbling he goes to walk in the woods with her, when the spring calls her, his grumbling interferes with her conscientious attempts to get next to nature, his grumbling taints the day. When she consults him, of a morning, about what to have for dinner, he wearily rejects all her suggestions, only to adopt them at noon, when he takes a friend out to lunch. Terrible is her competence in the home. She can find many things while he is seeking one thing. With any old implement caught up in the kitchen, with the merest hairpin, she can in a jiffy do repairs to which he has long been laying, with a whole tool-kit, half-hearted siege.

Tactless though Friend Wife may be, she is no such egotist as Man. In his judgment upon Man Briggs is at one with Pascal. *Peu de chose nous console, parce que peu de chose nous afflige.* We are depressed by such trifles, thinking them no trifles, as a topped drive or a missed putt. We are elated if by chance we land on the green in three, and boast to unlistening bystanders that this happy accident is our true form, asking them fatuously what they know about that. Interrupt us at Kelly, no matter for how short a time, and we snarl and vociferate, unless the interruption be the work of some free spender, who wants George the colored waiter to take the orders. Self-deceiving braggarts, all of us, and most innocently fond of the rewards and consolations that await us at the nineteenth hole.

But it was a mistake to say that Briggs's boys and girls grow up and turn into parents. It was a mistake to say that golf-players and Friend Wives have offspring. Briggs's parents do not play games. They are a class apart. They exist only as parents, as powerful members of that league, consisting of mothers, fathers, teachers, neighbors, formed on purpose to make childhood do uncongenial things, like answering questions, reciting Longfellow in irreverent school rooms, leaving waif and stray dogs outside instead of adding them to the family, being helpful about the house. Great as the harm is which these parents do, yet they cannot extend their power everywhere. Much of life is out of their reach. Were this not so there would be no Days of Real Sport, days of freedom and games, of swimming and snowballing, of the circus and choosing up, no days when friends call so joyously on Skinnay to come on over. Briggs remembers everybody's childhood, and has put it all down for everybody's delight. Unlike those unfortunate cartoonists who think first of an idea, and then cold-bloodedly turn it into a picture, he sees his idea and his picture at the same moment, as the same thing. And year by year his extraordinarily well seen world grows wider and more humorous.

Q. K.

Expert or Strategist

FOR eighteen months before the publication of the Dardanelles report, Mr. Churchill was, most unjustly, under a cloud. He had not made fast friends with any one section of politics. The Conservatives did not trust him because he had ratted from the party on the question of free trade; the Liberals because they suspected him of "unsoundness" on some planks in the party platform and because they had lived so long in phrases that a realist like Mr. Churchill gave them shivers. Those who wanted to ginger up the war were cold towards him because his name was connected with the Dardanelles, the greatest failure of the war, and the moderates, because they remembered phrases of his about digging rats out of their holes. Quite a number of people who admired his abilities thought him unlucky and "fey," as the Scotch say. The result was that when Mr. Churchill dropped out of the Cabinet he nearly dropped out of politics altogether. On army policy since his fall he made not only the best speeches but the only speeches that meant anything in particular, but they were very generally ignored. The publication of the Dardanelles report has changed all that. Mr. Churchill is back in politics and before long may be a power again in the country. Americans can hardly be expected to interest themselves in the details of a long, complicated and not over well written report, but in its broad outlines the story is not for one country but for all, not of one personality but of principles that go to the root of a sound war policy in any country.

It must never be forgotten that Churchill is a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marlborough. He has the same directness, the same impatience of opposition, the same hawk-like swoop on the one piece of meaty relevancy in a mass of details. Mr. Lloyd George has that gift too, but his mind is Celtic and volatile. Mr. Churchill is more persistent; he is characteristically English in the way in which, having conceived an idea, he cannot let go until something is made of it. His advocacy of an idea never remains abstract, and must translate itself into action. Thus it was that Mr. Churchill, having seen sooner than most people the chance offered by the German neglect of Antwerp at the beginning of the war, was not content with intellectual apprehension of the fact, like the rest of his colleagues, but insisted on some attempt being made to seize the chance. The same idea had been in General French's mind too when he transferred his army from the Aisne into Flanders, and thus our best chance of winning the war early in the west was missed only by a very narrow margin. Mr. Churchill was attacked for the blunders of the Antwerp expedition, but never got the credit for his boldness and his energy.

After the failure at Antwerp Mr. Churchill saw that the chance of strategic victory on the west was gone. He could not reconcile himself to the trench warfare that had now set in and the terrible hardship and drain of human life. The bare idea, which was very popular at that time, of winning the war by "attrition" was anathema to a man of Mr. Churchill's intellectuality. He became a whole-hearted "easterner." Having failed to turn the German flank at Antwerp he wanted to turn it at Constantinople. Once again he was met by the plea that there were not troops to be had for the enterprise. Yet the whole art in war consists in obtaining superiority at the decisive point, and Mr. Churchill was undoubtedly right in singling out Constantinople as that point. One hundred thousand men used at the right time in the east would have accomplished more for victory than ten times that number did in the west. Mr. Churchill was undoubtedly right, and what is more, English people are coming round to his opinion though now it is too late to act on it. The Dardanelles Committee seems to take this view strongly; and of course the real cause of the downfall of the Coalition Cabinet was the failure of its military policy in the east.

Granting, however, that the idea of attacking Constantinople was right, whom are we to blame for the mess that was made of it? Popular judgment made Mr. Churchill the scapegoat. He had a good idea and he ruined it by his impatience. But the evidence does not quite justify this view. It was natural that Mr. Churchill, convinced of the soundness of his idea, but denied the troops that were required to carry it out, should wonder whether the thing could be done by the fleet alone. But the most amazing thing in the whole report is that, blankly unorthodox as the idea of using ships to attack heavy shore fortifications was, not a single one of Mr. Churchill's expert advisers opposed it. A good many of them disliked the attack but none of them for the reasons which led to its failure. Lord Fisher wanted to attack somewhere else, Sir Henry Jackson did not see what the fleet could do after it had forced the Narrows, and so on; but of expert objection to a purely naval attack on shore fortifications there was no sign. On the other hand, Admiral Carden, commanding in the Mediterranean, seems to have had no doubt of the power of the fleet to get through, and his plans were followed implicitly. As it turned out, the fleet could have got through had it continued the attack on the day after the failure, though this was not the kind of thing that Admiral Carden had planned. But the very last charge that can be justly brought against Mr. Churchill is that of ignoring his technical advisers. In so far as they were vocal he followed them implicitly both in the original plans of forcing the Straits, which were clearly wrong, and in the abandonment of a naval attack, which, as it turned out, was wrong too. It would be juster to say that Mr. Churchill was misled by his naval advisers than that he ran them off their feet.

It has been said that if Mr. Churchill had only waited he would have had the troops that would have made success certain. We wonder. It is true that in February, before the first bombardment began, plans were already being made for the dispatch of troops, but Lord Kitchener's delay over the Twenty-ninth Division lost three valuable weeks and contributed perhaps more than any other single cause to the failure of the subsequent land operations. But it was only the willingness of the fleet to lead the way that overcame the objections of the War Office to the employment of troops in Gallipoli. Had the Admiralty not been first, the War Office would never have followed. The truth is that Mr. Churchill had to fight against a very big vested military interest in France. It was natural that the army in France, having had such a hard struggle to maintain itself against heavy odds, should want for its own sphere of action the increment of our military strength and should regard any other campaign jealously as a rival suitor for men and guns. That was the real reason why the men were not forthcoming early enough and in sufficient numbers to make the capture of Constantinople a certainty. The main brunt of this struggle for men fell on Mr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Churchill. Mr. Asquith and the civilian members of the War Council were all intellectually convinced of the soundness of the Dardanelles enterprise, but they did not believe in it sufficiently to put up the necessary fight for men. The whole idea which strategically was the best in the war was the Cinderella of the War Council. The eldest sister in France had the first pick of everything, and Cinderella's portion was what was left over. It is one of the paradoxes of the war that public opinion should have accepted these false values so obediently. They seemed to regard any shell-battered village in Flanders as worth more than Constantinople, the key to the east. Losses in Gallipoli were bitterly lamented. In France they might be quadrupled and quintupled but were received with the most stoical fortitude.

One of the most interesting general questions raised by the Dardanelles report is the right use of the expert. In this case it is evident that a very bad use was made of him. According to both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, although they were members of the War Cabinet they did not think it their duty to state their objections to what was being done unless they were expressly invited to do so. And at least one member of the committee, Mr. Fisher, thought they were quite right and that any other practice would have been inconsistent with ministerial responsibility. Yet if they were right it is quite clear that the experts, if they were not to speak freely at a War Council, should have been meeting in some separate council at which they would have spoken. Perhaps the whole idea of bringing in experts as members of Cabinet councils is wrong, and instead of increasing their legitimate influence as it was intended to do, actually diminished it. The sounder plan may be to keep the councils of ministers and the councils of experts separate, the one concerning themselves with the ends of policy and the other with the means (if there are any) to those ends. What too often happens when the two are brought on to the same council is that the ministers concern themselves with details of executive action and the experts with the general principles of policy; and the resultant policy is not a combination of political and military wisdom but of two *inexpertises*—the politicians' ignorance of tactics, and the experts' ignorance of politics. Clausewitz and the modern German writers on war always insist that it is a mode of politics with violent action against the enemy in the place of peaceful persuasion of one's fellow citizens. The saying is truer of strategy than of tactics. Strategy is a branch of politics; indeed, one is tempted to say in the light of this war that the average statesman is better fitted to control the strategy of war than the average generals. Nearly all the great strategists have been not professional soldiers but politicians or scholars with a taste for military affairs. Tactics, on the other hand, the actual winning of battles when the troops have been brought in position, are the affairs of the experts. Yet how few of the great soldiers of history had been military experts; Napoleon to the end of his days never knew anything of minor tactics. The newspaper talk therefore of trusting the expert or "man on the spot" where the general strategic direction of a war is concerned is mere cant. Better trust the statesman with a taste for war; and if he has not the taste he has no business to be directing it. But in tactics, in the means to the end as distinguished from the end, the expert should be supreme.

H. SIDEBOTHAM.

Women Volunteers

I KNOW a woman who is honestly eager to help with the work of the war in whatever way she can. She does not call herself patriotic and she manages to change the conversation if anyone else does. The war is no glorified affair of honor to her. It seems a grim and revolting piece of business, but one that has to be gone through with before the international air will be fit to breathe again. She has reached the point where the whole horrible situation is so much with her that the need to do something definite about it is imperative.

And so she is consulting friends and newspapers. There is no dearth of advice. There is rather too much. At least a dozen new organizations have industrious press agents, each of them announcing the only way to patriotic salvation. She could join rifle clubs or cavalry societies or associations for the relief of needy militia men's families or leagues whose programs pose as compendiums of nationally useful activities. But they aren't completely satisfactory to her. She can't altogether drop the suspicion that most of their leaders are using the world crisis either as food for sentimentality or as chance for self-advertising. Still this wouldn't matter if she didn't also feel doubtful of their efficiency. They seem to generate much more fervor of the For God for Country and for Home variety than authentic information about the practical work to be done. She is now openly wishing that the government would make up its mind just where and when women workers are really needed, and then draft them and put them there—incidentally granting woman suffrage, of course.

This woman may be an unduly cautious volunteer, but her case is not isolated. There are many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other women throughout the country who are asking what they can actually do besides attending war relief balls or digging up their backyards. Like her they are being urged to join multifarious societies, and like her they are hesitating about the choice. They volunteer just the same, of course, just as she has done, but it is with a perplexed wonder about a government that gracefully acknowledges the importance of women's war service, and yet leaves the conducting of it to amateur and rivaling societies.

The first step has been made, however, toward solving their perplexity. The Council of National Defense has now appointed a Committee of Women's Defense Work. That in itself is not necessarily reassuring, but the personnel of this committee inspires confidence. Dr. Anna Howard Shaw is the Chairman, and the members represent the most powerful women's organizations in the country. Their sphere of influence has not as yet been more than vaguely indicated as the "superintending of women's war service activities," but it will probably not take them long to do the obvious things of eliminating the unfit societies, and teaching the promising ones the somewhat unfamiliar art of coöperation. And if they are really bent on bringing order into chaos, they will probably advocate some form of conscription for women.

This would mean of course a selective draft. Women of military age should be required to register their occupation, alternate abilities, dependents, physical fitness, and conscientious objections to war service. According to an expert estimate of how many women workers will be needed in food-production and industry, the necessary number could be chosen from these registration lists and set to work. If an able-bodied man with no one dependent on him can be called out to dig trenches, there is no good reason why an able-bodied woman, similarly placed, should not be called out to hoe potatoes.

Knowing just what to do with the conscripts may not be very easy, but it seems a great deal simpler than knowing what to do with the volunteers. Contrary to the behavior of American men, most American women are volunteering in all directions, generally, however, in the wrong ones, and the only thing that will systematize this epidemic of enlisting is some sort of conscription. Find out where and when the country will need women to do extra work or to replace men, and then put them there. All the arguments in favor of conscription for men apply to conscription for women. It would solve the question for the woman eager to serve and honestly in doubt as to where her services are most needed. She may then be told her duty is in her ordinary daily occupation. But what almost seems the most desirable result would be the effect on those groups of select volunteers who mobilize in the spotlight of newspaper attention and nearly make one wish for peace at any price. Take for instance the Economy League of the Junior Colonial Dames. According to an interview in the World, "the details of their scheme are being worked out by a group of very well known young society women." The scheme is to save waste paper and auction it off. "Among other resources," continues the interview, "members of the Economy League have made arrangement with the Fifth Avenue shops whereby we receive half price for every box which we send back to them. We have written to all the Easter brides and asked them to give us the boxes and the cotton sheaths in which their silver and other wedding presents were delivered. The money goes to the Red Cross. Every bit of the secretarial and other work connected with the League, the girls are doing themselves, and I think the training will be an excellent thing for them."

No doubt it will. Under a selective draft system their brothers, however, will not be reserved for such mild training on account of their being Junior Colonial Gentlemen. The girls are probably in better health and more athletic and certainly enjoy more leisure than most other girls. They could be of unquestionable service to the country if they were employed eight hours a day at some fairly heavy factory work or unskilled farm labor. Think of the experience it would be to get blistered hands and sore feet, and not be rewarded by any further notice than being told that it's all in the day's work, or that it's only what America expects of every woman. That would be training worthy of being called real education, and there probably would be no time for interviews about it.

Other examples of wasteful volunteering are the various women's self-defense leagues and rifle clubs and revolver societies. Most of them are patrician as well as patriotic. One announces "shooting afternoons over which hostesses of social prominence will preside. Special chaperones will be provided for children's afternoons. Prizes will be offered for the best shots, and officers of the army and navy are asked to coöperate."

For the sake of efficiency, as well as for the preservation of national sanity, this sort of thing ought to be stopped. It ought to be stopped at least until a military census and a selective draft had made sure that all the women needed to carry on the necessary industry and food-production were in their proper places. Then the remainder could continue with rifle afternoons, beauty chorus brigades, and military drill in khaki costumes of guaranteed attractiveness. It would still be ir-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ritating, of course, but one would have the comforting assurance that it wasn't interfering with the energies of any of the women who should be doing real work for the nation.

No one would maintain that thousands of women aren't doing real work now, which only misses being most effective because it isn't systematized under government control. Besides the froth of genteel patriotism that is such a godsend to the society editors there is strong current of will-to-usefulness which is determined to find channels. Witness the feverish classes in camp cooking, wireless telegraphy, agriculture, general and specific, ambulance driving, nursing, and so on. If the result seems chaotic most of the women volunteers aren't really responsible for it. There has been no centralizing power, no voice of national authority to say just what ought to be done and how. Both old and new organizations had to plunge in with nothing much to guide them except the slogan of "See what the English women have done!" Naturally there has been much waste effort and much overlapping of activities, and not a little tension among the most important organizations each of whom strives to be considered the central one. But even under these conditions things have been accomplished, and it will devolve on the new Committee of Women's Defense Work to make use of whatever machinery has already been set in motion.

And the first use to make of it would be to take a military census of women in every state. Such far-reaching groups as the suffragists and the General Federation of Women's Clubs could do this easily and without great expense. With the aid of this census the Committee would know exactly the available woman power, and could distribute it according to the actual need. This would answer the question of the woman who wants to help but doesn't know where to begin, it would do away with wasteful volunteering, and it might pin the patriotic butterfly down to something more concrete than writing notes to all the Easter brides. The existing organizations could still take charge of the work, each of them perhaps being assigned to a special branch of it, but the thing of most importance would be the central control exercised by the government through its Committee.

It has been said often enough that the work of women in wartime is fully as important as that of the men in the field. The government, however, does not leave the mobilization of its soldiers to the well meant but scattered efforts of private organizations. The army and navy are not superintended by the Sons of the American Revolution, the Maccabees or the Y. M. C. A. The problem can't be dismissed by saying that the army of women workers will need no organized and special training. The threatened world famine will not be averted by women who volunteer for agriculture with not much more equipment for it than the proposed "slip-on garment that will act as a protection without sacrificing grace and dignity." Neither can good intentions and khaki uniforms take the place of a certain amount of training when it comes to the making of munitions.

Government control of women's war service is not a purely academic idea. A short while ago the French government introduced a measure for the mobilization of the entire civilian population, "in order that there may be no wasted effort." The principal features of the bill were, first, voluntary enrolment for citizens of both sexes, of Allied and neutral nations as well as of France, between the ages of seventeen and sixty years; second that invitations to enlist should be sent to persons who did not come forward voluntarily; and third that those who did not respond either voluntarily or to invitation should be enrolled by the government and assigned to work.

France is in extreme straits, and it is not at all certain that the United States need follow her example to the letter. Probably the first and second parts of the French measure would be sufficient here; introducing a sort of controlled volunteering. And, of course, the government should not be allowed to forget that the recognition of women as necessary to the war service would inevitably mean the recognition of their right to the ballot.

SIGNE K. TOKSVIG.

At the Capitol

WITH the passage of the administration army measure, by majorities not anticipated, there is no longer the same pressure bearing upon Congress. After the President's address of April 2nd a more or less ready response in declaring war, and in enacting the bond issue and conscription bills, was almost inevitable. With these matters out of the way, Congress is more at home. Its present business—the first war revenue bill—has not the compulsion of an impatient expectancy on the part of the public. The sentiment which has seemed so compelling does not in this case exist; throughout the country there is little unanimity on how to go about raising at once the first billion and a half dollars of the necessary revenue. It is largely a matter of tradition and local bias. In a way the revenue bill will be the first test of the President's influence over a war Congress, and of the comparatively uncoerced reaction of Congress to the war.

For the decision of Congress will disclose how many of those members who have not been in sympathy with recent events, but have climbed aboard the band-wagon nevertheless, with cries of "standing by the President," will now continue to stand by him in working for revenue legislation by which the expenses of the war will be sustained, "so far as they can equitably be sustained, by the present generation." Instead of reinforcing the tolerably solidified

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opinion behind the earlier administration measures, the revenue bill will in fact split the most vigorous support which those measures have had. By some members it will be held that a sixteen per cent tax on excess profits above eight per cent will discourage investment and the productivity necessary in wartime. Others will believe that the burden is not formidable, or too precipitately applied to suppress the sense of security in having further resources to draw upon. The questions of the rates and limits for income taxes, of the extent to which indirect taxation is to be employed, and of what luxuries may most fairly be assessed, will put Congress back at its more familiar work of detailed consideration and bartered support.

At home in a field where issues are easily confused and where the irresponsibility of the committee system offers opportunities, Congress may hope for the first time to oppose the administration effectively, if it desires to do so. Contrary to a somewhat general impression, the recent bond issue bill did not place a lump sum of four billion dollars at the disposal of the government for the conduct of the war. Three billions were definitely set aside for extending credit to foreign governments; but for the balance to be available further legislation must be enacted. A series of appropriation bills will have to draw upon the total that is authorized. In framing these bills it is obvious that the detailed expenses of conducting a war cannot be anticipated. Yet the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations in a recent address in the House vigorously approved the principle that " the language of these bills ought to be submitted in detail, so that when the money is expended the specific authority would be carried in the bills to expend that sum of money for that particular purpose." How far Congress, or a part of it, will insist upon an anticipation of detail which is not possible will develop later; but it is apparent that in the future there will be better opportunities for a display of Congressional independence.

Before such a situation is reached, however, the action of Congress on the revenue bill will furnish a test of the administration's influence when it is not backed energetically by public opinion. Congress of itself will not go far toward meeting the issue directly. The debate on the revenue measure is likely to run chiefly to a dragging in of familiar arguments whose soundness has never been established. It will be contended, for instance, that taxation as a means of financing war is the worst way of avoiding inflation and a consequent rise in prices; that the policy of borrowing shifts what is only a fair share of the burden from the present to future generations; that onerous taxation discourages the extension of existing enterprises, and cuts down the production necessary to an industrial war. There will be many warnings not to kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Lincoln, Adams, Washington and Jefferson will be quoted—both by the advocates and by the opponents of a strong taxation policy. The tariff issue will be taken up, with new reasonableness. And, if the discussion follows the usual lines of Congressional debate, more attention will be given to certain minor considerations than to those of first importance. There will be little discussion of whether it is financially wise, rather than morally fair, to saddle posterity with a major part of the war debt—and a great deal of debate whether a musical instrument is a more taxable luxury, proportionately, than an automobile, whether soft drinks should be taxed two cents a gallon or two and a small fraction, whether cigars, generally believed to be less injurious, should bear the same rate as cigarettes.

The fact that so much of the discussion on the revenue bill will be concerned with incidental considerations, and even with irrelevancies, is particularly unfortunate in view of the little clear understanding there is outside of Congress. A universally satisfactory revenue bill is out of the question; but it will at least be desirable that what is at issue be defined without vagueness. There are a few members of Congress who will sift out the distracting political and local considerations, and present an unconfused choice of methods. A better law will be drawn if, when these members address Congress, the press will give them the attention which it customarily pays to the more or less sensational incidents of the debate which have no significance. Unless they know where and how to apply their influence, those who want this war financed so far as possible by the present generation will be without voice in the decision. Ready support should be thrown behind those members of Congress who show an inclination in this direction. For when peace comes there will be new policies of national development that will require ample revenue, and not what can be spared from the costs of an unnecessarily heavy war debt. C. M.

CORRESPONDENCE

An Independent Bohemian-Slovak State

SIR: In November, 1915, a committee of Czechs and Slovaks, led by Professor Masaryk, issued a manifesto demanding the reconstruction of an independent Bohemian-Slovak State. The Allies, as a condition of permanent peace demand the liberation of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination. Is it not time for the world to consider the demand for Bohemian independence?

An independent Bohemian-Slovak state means the dissolution of the Austrian empire. Many who have carefully considered the Austrian problem prefer the federalization of Austria to its dissolution.

If the present war does not result in the cession of that Austrian territory inhabited by Italians to Italy, Italian desire for a completion of the national process of unification will not abate. This is true of the Rumanians and the Serbs. Ultimately the historical process of unification of various nationalities in national states will be consummated; if then Austria remains in existence, the only nations left within it will be the Germans, the Magyars and the Czecho-Slovaks.

Austria so mutilated would mean further oppression of Czechs and Slovaks by the Germans and Magyars; consequently Austria would continue to be a menace to European peace.

The Austrian question is the Turkish problem in another form. To permit Austria to exist in any form at the conclusion of this war is merely to delay the solution of a problem that will never down.

Austria is Germany's bridge to the east; it is now, and, if preserved, will continue to be, the vassal of Germany. The Empire's ruling classes deliberately connived at provoking this war in order to crush the Slav nationalities, and in order to save German and Magyar hegemony.

The federalization of Austria and the safeguarding of the rights of Czechs and Slovaks in Austria could be achieved only at the point of allied guns. This is no easier and perhaps decidedly more difficult than to dissolve Austria and get rid of the problem forever.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Czechs have proven the possibility of independence by their economic and cultural development. Economically and financially the Czech countries are the richest of the present Austrian "provinces," and when freed of oppressive taxation, discriminating in favor of financially "passive" Austrian lands, the independent Bohemian-Slovak state would be even richer. At the present time 62.7 per cent of the burden of Austrian taxation is borne by the Czech countries, while the rest of Austria carries only 37.3 per cent.

When we take into consideration the undeveloped resources of Slovakia, we see very readily that economically a Bohemian-Slovak state would be amply able to stand on its own feet.

Joining the Czechs in their future state should be the Slovaks of Hungary, who form a part of the same ethnic group as the Bohemians, and desire to be joined with the Czechs in one state. This wish should be gratified not only because it manifests a natural tendency, but also because it is in the interests of Europe to meet it.

Lack of direct access to the sea is not an insurmountable obstacle. It is important, but with modern communications not as important as in the past. The sea affords a means of communication; the means of communication makes little difference if a country is confronted by high tariffs. Furthermore, how this question of access to the sea may be solved is indicated by Mr. Toynbee in a recent work advocating the granting of economic rights of way to landlocked states.

Fears are occasionally expressed that the Czechs and Slovaks would oppress the German and Magyar minority. In Central and Eastern Europe hardly any state can be constructed without certain national minorities. In this case these are not as large as would seem on the basis of the false Austrian and Magyar statistics. Still it ought to be fairly easy to safeguard the interests of a German and Magyar minority in a Bohemian-Slovak State, certainly easier than to protect the rights of Czecho-Slovaks in a deformed Austria.

Prior to the war, in spheres where the Czechs had any degree of self-government, the Germans were never denied their legitimate needs. The municipality of Prague has always furnished adequate school facilities for the small German minority in Prague; this is more than was ever done by municipalities in the hands of Germans and with Bohemian minorities.

The policy of denationalization of other peoples is one peculiar almost wholly to the Germans. The Slavs have never been noted for attempts to impose their language upon other nationalities. Even the reactionary policies of Russia have been largely due to the Junkers from Russian Baltic provinces who are of German descent.

I would not even fear the joining of purely German parts of Austria to the German Empire. This would carry the principle of nationality to its logical conclusion. To the German Empire would be added a few million Germans, but it would be deprived of the support of a much larger number of Slavs, who are being made use of to fight the battles of their enemy.

Again, let it not be forgotten that the Czechs are asking for something which de jure they never lost. The Hapsburgs were called to the Bohemian throne by the free will of the representatives of the Bohemian State, and they undertook by solemn oaths and pledges to protect and safeguard the independence of this state. The violation of such pledges on their part, and the deprivation of the Czechs of independence by force, does not do away with the legal rights of the Czechs safeguarded at the time of the union.

The fact that the Czechs at one time had a strong and powerful state, well organized, is also a sufficient proof of inherent political capacity.

Bismarck maintained that the power that rules Bohemia rules Europe. Such a problem cannot be permitted to remain unsolved. The only possible permanent solution is the reconstruction of a Bohemian-Slovak state.

CHARLES PERGLER.

Cresco, Iowa.

Alsace-Lorraine

SIR: Mr. Arnold Toynbee's book, Nationality and the War is, on the whole, admirably fair-minded and well-informed; the chief lesson that it impresses upon the reader's mind is that the application of even a sound principle is fraught with difficulties, and that it is necessary to adopt some compromise. With this general contention I heartily agree. But I believe that Mr. Arnold Toynbee does not always put facts in their true light or point to the most acceptable solution. I should like, in particular, to challenge his position on the Alsace-Lorraine problem.

It was my privilege, in the summer of 1913, to investigate that thorny question under the direction of Dr. David Starr Jordan. We had interviews with the leaders of all parties; with journalists, manufacturers, priests and officials; with Centrists and with Socialists; with Secretary Mandel as well as with Abbé Wetterlé and Uncle Hansi. The conclusions we arrived at are materially different from those of Mr. Arnold Toynbee, who advocates the partition of Lorraine along the linguistic line of demarcation, and a plebiscite to determine the future of Alsace.

For one thing, any linguistic map of Alsace, and even of Lorraine, is bound to be misleading. The line of cleavage is not so much geographic as it is social. The common people, in the greater part of the provinces, are still speaking their local Teutonic dialect. Before 1870 the upper and middle classes used French as the language of culture, and many used it as their sole language. Strangely enough, it seems as though that infiltration of French from the upper reaches of society down has continued under German rule, and in spite of the most thoroughgoing efforts.

Then it ought to be obvious that language, in debatable borderlands like Alsace-Lorraine, is no absolute criterion of nationality. If it were, Belgium and Switzerland would have no right to national existence.

Finally, Mr. Toynbee, in one of his maps, classes Alsace with those countries whose inclinations are uncertain, as they never had a chance to express them. No country has ever had a more dramatic chance of expressing its choice and no country has ever expressed its choice more emphatically. In 1871 the delegates of Alsace to the National Assembly, at Bordeaux, were elected under the eyes of the German troops; they voiced the unanimous protest of the population against annexation to Germany. When they had to send representatives to the German Reichstag, those representatives were no less decided and no less unanimous. It was not in Alsace that the hope of reunion with France first grew dim, but in France. Then, and then only, did Alsace feel that she had to make the best of the situation, and "follow her head, not her heart." The noble protest of the Alsatian deputies in 1871 rings as clear to-day as it did forty-six years ago. "Transferred against their will to a foreign domination," they declared the transfer morally null and void. During the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forty-four years of uneasy truce, Alsace has been occupied even as northern France is now occupied; and the lasting peace of Europe requires that the Alsatian protest be now heeded. The treaty of Frankfort must be torn, and the Alsace-Lorraine question must be settled anew, on the basis of justice.

Partition cannot settle the question, which is one, not of languages and territories, but of principle; this, however, does not mean that no compromise would be possible. The history of Alsace before 1648 and after 1871 cannot be disregarded; neither should the rights of the German immigrants into the Reichsland be ignored. I beg to submit, without any comment, a list of the solutions of the Alsace-Lorraine problem that do not involve a partition of the provinces:

First, the status quo, i. e. Alsace-Lorraine as a semi-autonomous member of the German Empire, with a constitution framed and granted by the imperial authorities.

Second, full autonomy within the German Empire, with a constitution freely voted by the people of Alsace-Lorraine, probably of a republican nature. This was the minimum that the Alsatians could hope to secure by peaceful means, and for which they were agitating before the war.

Third, political independence—with or without guaranteed neutrality—but with membership in the German Zollverein. This was the position of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg before the war.

Fourth, full political and economic independence—with or without guaranteed neutrality—Germany and France enjoying equal trade rights in the new state. This was substantially the situation of Belgium and Switzerland.

Fifth, political independence, but with economic union with France.

Sixth, autonomy, and union with France under a general or special scheme of "regional" self-government.

Seventh, unconditional return to France as three French "départements," with possibly a special régime for a few years.

I shall not attempt to express and justify my preference for any of the above schemes. But of this I am certain: no solution will prove workable in the end that does not allow the fullest equality for the different languages spoken in Alsace-Lorraine and the greatest possible measure of self-government.

"Alsace was a bridge between France and Germany; now it is a chasm." This is the strongest indictment of German rule in the Reichsland for the last forty-six years. Restore the bridge, and France and Germany shall have peace.

ALBERT LÉON GUÉRARD.

Houston, Texas.

Fears Only America

SIR: Can the Hohenzollerns survive? you ask in your paper of April 28th, and conclude with an appeal to the German-Americans to issue a statement at the proper time, apparently to the effect that they would like to have the Hohenzollerns disappear from the political horizon of Germany.

The German-Americans are more deeply, and far more properly, concerned with the disappearance from our own political horizon of the forces which are making a mockery of our Constitution and the principles on which this nation was founded.

When the war in Europe began, one or the other of us may have been thinking more of the country of our fathers than of the United States, because the tremendous odds against which Germany was fighting seemed to call for the help of all who loved her and her people. Soon, however, the conviction took hold of us that it was not Germany but our own new country which most needed the attention of all lovers of freedom. Deceived alike by the press and by incomplete official publications of documents the American people were to be driven, it appeared, into a frame of mind where an alliance with Great Britain would seem to be desirable for the people and humanity, when in fact it was desirable only for the exploiters of the people and the exploiters of the resources of the country.

Even if one were to grant your charges against the Hohenzollerns—which nobody who knows Germany and the life of William II can truthfully grant—what concern is it of ours what form of government the German people prefer? None! We do not live in Germany and, with possibly a few exceptions, have no intentions of living there in the future. It is on the other hand very much our concern what kind of an administration we have in this country. It may be true, or it may not be true that Germany is a democracy with a monarchical form of government, but it is true, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that at the present time we are living under an absolute autocracy thinly disguised as a democracy.

We have a Constitution. This Constitution guarantees to all persons, whether or no they are citizens, absolute security "in their persons, houses, papers and effects" so long as they obey the law. It forbids the arbitrary seizure of their property or their arrest without a warrant, and promises them a speedy trial if indicted. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," says the Constitution, article 1, section 9, number 2, "shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."

With consummate disregard of these specific commands of the Constitution, men who have come here believing America to be honest, are being arrested every day without warrants, are being spirited away without notice to their families, kept incommunicando, prevented from appealing to the courts. Property is constantly being seized arbitrarily, houses and papers are being searched without warrants, and all this is being done under the specific orders of the President and the Attorney-General, both of whom have sworn to obey the Constitution. Congress is paying no attention to these infractions, and one Senator is even quoted as having said in Congress that there are times when the Constitution must be deemed to be out of force!

Not satisfied with having connived in the disregard of the Constitution by our office holders, Congress has just passed a "selective draft" bill. This gives the administration the arbitrary power to say who shall and who shall not be drafted into the army. There is no appeal from the decision of the administration. This gives the administration the power to send to war any citizen, or the son or relative of any citizen, whose disapproval is annoying to it.

Russia used to have the reputation of having the most arbitrary and cruel government in the world, because it wielded these two powers: the power of secret arrest without recourse to the courts; and the power of drafting arbitrarily into the army whomever it pleased.

These two powers, I believe, are to-day enjoyed by only one government in the whole world, and this is our own.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It matters little whether you call the man who wields such powers a Czar or an Emperor or a President, whether he claims such powers by divine right, or by stress of circumstances, or whether the powers have been thrust upon him—these powers are undemocratic.

There is a significant parable in the Bible of a man who had a beam in his own eye, but foolishly thought more of extracting the mote from his brother's eye. Do not let us imitate this man! Before we waste much time crying to rid Germany of her Hohenzollerns, let us make autocracy impossible in our own country, and strive to set our own house in order. The United States should be a republic in fact as well as in name.

EDMUND VON MACH.

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Humanity and Outcasts

SIR: One of your correspondents says the illegitimate child will always be an outcast under moral law; which sounds pretty bad for moral law. It is worth remembering that good men have repeatedly told us that there are no illegitimate children, but only illegitimate parents. And it requires no superhuman vision and no superlative righteousness for anyone to see that an ideal which determines always to punish forever an innocent human being for that of which he is in no respect guilty is a detestable sham and a reproach to any "society" or "civilization."

What "we call" virtue or what "we call" vice is of very little consequence in comparison with the rights of a human soul and a human body—and complacent artificial codes to the contrary notwithstanding. Every child of illegitimate parents should receive from society more than a just measure of consideration, help and respect. There is nothing in the Christian religion to forbid this, whatever there may be in so-called moral and legal statutes. We are surely to be pitied, if with every variety of evil all about us, we are persuaded that the "immorality" of existence of any human life is something for us to persecute and oppress.

JOHN HUTCHINSON, M.D.

New York City.

Conscription for All

SIR: For reasons familiar to most of us I am against conscription, but in that argument I would not now engage. What I want to emphasize are the shortsightedness and the injustice, particularly the injustice, given conscription, of limiting conscription. The only form of conscription I hear proposed is that of one sex and of a certain age class—males between the ages, say, of twenty and twenty-five, successive drafts to be made on age-classes up to the age of forty-eight.

In the present war it has been stated again and again that women are needed as well as men and none would argue, I suppose, that men not only over twenty-five but men over forty-eight were not needed. In the manifold national service modern war requires there is a job for every one. Why then in applying the principle of conscription should one class and only one class be conscripted?

Not that the principle of exemption should be disregarded. That principle is applied within the single conscript class. It is applied on the theory that war service would preclude other service of the community equally, if not more, important. What classes of community servants should be exempt from war conscription the community itself must decide. To be considered among these classes are persons who render private services in default of which the community would be called upon, i. e., persons of either sex or of any age who are the economic supports or the personal caretakers of invalids, of the aged, of children. And women for a certain period before and after childbirth should of course be exempt.

The community must be free, however, to work out its own theory of exemption, to evaluate community service, direct or indirect, as it likes. All one asks is that the theory of exemption be based logically and completely on the theory of service. As it is, in the contemplated exemption of all women and of men over a specified age, I can see only sex favoritism or age class tyranny. To call the conscription of very young men universal conscription is quite as farcical as it would be to call the right of voting, if limited to the same class of young men, universal suffrage.

MIDDLEAGED WOMAN.

Conscientious Objector Answered

SIR: In reply to Mr. Lewis Stiles Gannett's questions regarding his stand as a conscientious objector in today's issue of The New Republic let me refer him and all who find themselves in agreement with him to a printed sermon by the Rev. John Haynes Holmes, preached in the Church of the Messiah at the morning service on April 1, and entitled, "A Statement to My People on the Eve of War." It costs five cents and can be obtained either from The Church Peace Union, 70 Fifth avenue, or the Church of the Messiah, Park avenue and Thirty-fourth street.

FRANK FITT.

West Orange, New Jersey.

Strategy in Peace

SIR: While accepting the facts presented in Mr. William Hard's article in your issue of March 31st, and keenly appreciating his penetrating analysis of the needs of the present situation, may I offer a comment upon his criticism of the American methods of preparedness? To prepare, during the last two years and a half, against an unknown foe to be met at some unknown time in the future, when events showed a possibility of an open breach with Germany, a definite opponent, before the end of the war, may now seem wasteful, but was it not absolutely the only just sort of preparedness then? To protest friendly relations with the German government, as we have rightly done up to the point where unfriendly relations were necessarily instituted, and at the same time most evidently to prepare against Germany, as Mr. Hard would apparently have had us do—would not this have savored of that Teutonic strategy which is so deeply offensive to us?

Honorable avoidance of war must always be more expensive, if war does finally come, than shifty policies and double-dealing. Does Mr. Hard truly wish us to mourn our loss, however? I do not think he does. It is his zeal for efficiency that has unwittingly betrayed him into this unflattering position.

CLARKE F. HUNN.

Washington, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The One and the Many

The Problem of Sovereignty, by Harold Laski. New Haven: Yale University Press. $2.50.

THE problem of sovereignty which Mr. Laski discusses is whether the seat of authority in society is single or manifold. In other words, whether a sound political theory is monist or pluralist.

He argues in favor of the pluralist view, and maintains that a society is a "person" in reality, not merely by a legal fiction; for the law merely recognizes and regularizes a preëxistent fact. He supports this argument by an appeal to the evidence supplied by three ecclesiastical and religious movements in the nineteenth century in Great Britain—the Scottish Disruption, the Oxford Movement, and the Catholic Revival,—and by the careers of Le Maistre and Bismarck on the Continent.

In each of the three British movements the contribution to political theory is entirely independent of theological correctness. It is possible to hold that the Free Church, the Tractarians and the Catholics were all entirely wrong in their theology, but that they are right in their political theory. No one has pointed out more clearly than Mr. Laski that on this point all three movements are identical.

The Disruption was the claim of part of the Scotch church to autonomy; the Oxford Movement represented the similar claim of the English church to the same right, free from the control of tribunals in whose appointment she had no share. In each case the struggle was based on resistance to the claim of the state to supreme sovereignty over the church, and the parallelism is obvious. In the case of the Catholic Revival there is a superficial difference: the English Catholics were contending not so much for freedom from the control exercised by the state, as for the recognition of their right to organized existence in the realm of England. In the previous case the question concerned corporate societies which by their nature were confined within the same national limits as the British state; in this case it concerned the right of citizens in relation to an extra national society. But the principle at stake was really the same as that in the Disruption or the Oxford Movement. All three cases represent a struggle, on the whole victorious, for the recognition of the principle that a corporation—in these cases a church—has a right to autonomy and to regulate its own development. To concede this is to concede the pluralist theory, and Mr. Laski tells each story from this point of view with admirable skill. Possibly he assumes at times too great a knowledge of the facts for American readers, and writes in an unduly allusive style, but to the mind of any one who comes from Oxford and has lived in its atmosphere, so permeated with the tradition of the Oxford Movement and Catholic Revival, the story seems excellently and sympathetically interpreted, for Oxford, though it gives an artificial mannerism which soon dies, gives also a real inspiration, which quickens as well as lives; and Mr. Laski belongs, I think, to those whom Oxford has taught to see life whole, as well as to study it in detail.

These three chapters show the practical triumph of the pluralist theory when contending against a state which as a whole was monistic in thought. The chapter on Le Maistre and Bismarck shows the corresponding failure of the active attempt of a monist state, even in the hands of strong men under favorable circumstances, to defeat pluralist opposition. The combination of the Ultramontane Le Maistre and the Evangelical Bismarck is bold and probably novel; but it is right. (It will surprise some readers to see Bismarck regarded as an essentially religious and theological man. Yet it is true; there is no class so truly attached to Evangelical Lutheranism as the Prussian Junkers. They are the firm friends of orthodoxy and usually the opponents of all scientific theology.) Both Le Maistre and Bismarck represent a monist theory; both had to admit failure in practice, and the conclusion which Mr. Laski draws is eloquent and sound. "Each saw truth as One, and therefore doubted the rightness of a sovereignty that was either fallible or divisible, and each in the end came to the realization that his theories were inconsistent with the facts of life. . . . An attitude which makes the boundaries of authority commensurate with the bounds of mind is at war with the instincts most pregnant with human good."

This pluralist theory clearly extends far beyond the limits of the ecclesiastical incidents which Mr. Laski has selected. What is true of the corporate person of a church, claiming a right to regulate its own existence, is equally true of a trades union, a trust, or a learned society. If the state is not to be supreme in the one case there is no reason why it should be in the other. The fact the church claims a divine commission, while a trades union does not, may obscure, but does not alter this fact. We concede the rights of the churches not because of their spiritual claims but even in spite of them. The truth is that the argument which regards the existence of an imperium in imperio as intolerable has been treated with too much respect. Why should we not have an imperium in imperio? asks Mr. Laski, and urges that in point of fact we never have anything else. Moreover, he brings his answer into line with sound philosophy by maintaining that the objection to our imperium in imperio is based on a disregard of the philosophic maxim that reality is not to be found in "the one" by itself or "the many" by itself, but in the "one *and* the many." The attempt to produce a single imperium is to see "the one" without "the many," and can never be real.

The same thing can perhaps be put a little differently, by saying that one of the qualities of life always is the possession of unstable equilibrium. Chemically and physically the equilibrium of a living body is unstable, and cannot be maintained except by the presence of life. We may not know what life is, but at least we know that it has the property of maintaining unstable or dynamic equilibria. What is true of the individual is true also of society. Apart from the existence of life, an imperium in imperio is as impossible a position for a state, regarded mechanically, as is standing upright impossible for a man, but, if life be present, it is the right attitude.

But this opens up new and attractive possibilities for the future. The state has been regarded as the final step in political thought. It has been clothed by liberals with the sovereignty which they denied to monarchs, and international politics has meant the relations of sovereign states to each other beyond which the force of nature could not go. Is it not certain that in the future the state must recognize within itself groups of men with a real corporate life, which, in Mr. Laski's sense, is "personal"? But the natural conclusion from this is that representative government ought to recognize this fact. Liberty means the liberty of "persons," not only of individuals, and similarly the "persons" who really have a right to be represented in the councils of the state are not merely individual men, but corporate persons. The English system which gave direct representation to universities was right, and instead of abolishing it Liberals ought to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extend it so as to give representation to all corporate persons. The ethical advantage of this change would be great, for, as things are, "interests" and "corporations" need representation and get it by illegitimate, clumsy, and deceitful methods, which would be unnecessary if it were recognized that the individual is not the only unit in political life.

Furthermore, it is clear that the modern state (if state mean nation) is a very much smaller thing than the modern economic unit: one of the main questions which seems at stake in the present war is concerned with this point. Can a great nation succeed, at least for the moment, in making its political national frontiers—its state—stretch out to the limits of the frontiers, of the economic unit to which it belongs? It will be disastrous to the national life of the smaller nations in the same unit if it can. Or must we accept the equally disastrous alternative which would ask us to limit economic progress by confining trade within national frontiers by means of economically false tariffs?

Both possibilities exist: either would be lamentable. The only way out of the dilemma is to recognize that economic growth demands a system which will provide a common superior of nations to coördinate them in subordination to the economic interests of the unit to which they belong, while doing justice to the national rights of each. We cannot have a league to enforce peace without an organization to coördinate commerce. Ultimately supranational interests such as scholarship, education, science, or religion might have representations in the international council which such a system demands. The existing nations would then become glaring examples of imperia in imperio, but if Mr. Laski be right, as I believe that he is, this would therefore be the best system, for it would combine the claims of unity and diversity, so that out of the war of nations would be born a new political "person" able to maintain the complicated and unstable equilibrium of modern civilization, because of the life which was in it.

K. L.

The Really Superior Sex

The Sexes in Science and History, by Eliza Burt Gamble. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. $1.50.

OSCAR WILDE divided books into three classes; books to read, books to re-read, and books not to read at all. In the latter class he placed "all argumentative books and all books that try to prove anything," and he would have included therein, one feels sure, the revised edition of The Sexes in Science and History—a prejudiced point of view with which the reader was for once inclined to sympathize. For though the author has brought together a number of absorbing facts which she has presented with clarity and arranged with no small degree of skill, yet the fact is increasingly borne in upon the guileless reader that she has done so with but one end in view—that of establishing by fair means or by foul her thesis of the inherent superiority of the female over the male.

The following quotations will sufficiently illustrate the case. In speaking of the hetairai of Athens, she remarks "To say that these women have been written about in an age in which male power and male influence have been in the ascendency, is to say that they have been misunderstood and their movements misinterpreted." Again, the disabilities characteristic of civilized woman will be seen to be a result of "the unchecked disruptive forces developed in man,—so soon as through the cultivation of the higher faculties developed in and transmitted through females, the lower nature of males has finally been brought within its legitimate bounds." "The history of human society during the last four hundred years has for the most part been a struggle between the constructive elements in human society and the destructive or disintegrating forces which are the result of the unchecked egoism or selfishness developed in man during the ages in which woman has been subject to his will."

In short, the female of every species is found to be inherently superior to the male. In her was developed the maternal instinct which resulted in the feeling of sympathy for others, in the social instincts, and in the moral sense. Later these became transmitted to a lesser degree to the grosser male nature which was intent primarily upon the gratification of its own selfish desires. The female's power of discrimination and her appreciation of beauty are contrasted with the male characteristics acquired as a result of passion—of pugnacity and perseverance. This superiority of the female led to her leadership in pre-historic society. Descent, as we know, was traced through her. She was also the guardian of liberty and justice, the initiator of industry, the pioneer in progress. At that happy period "there was no poverty and no crime. Disease as we know it was unknown. As the lands were held in common, women were absolutely free and independent. They chose their mates and were responsible for the wellbeing of their offspring. As women controlled the sexual relation and themselves regulated prenatal conditions, the children inherited strong bodies and healthy minds. Dissensions over property did not occur, and jealousy and a desire for personal aggrandizement had not been developed."

These assertions, I expect, would be as difficult to disprove as they appear to be to prove. Mankind has always felt the necessity for a Golden Age of one sort or period, or another. We know now of what some of those Golden Ages actually consisted. It seems only logical, therefore, to demand some further return in the way of proof, before surrendering credence to Miss Gamble's pre-historic utopia.

She is apparently one of those who delight in that rather futile form of exercise known as sex-warfare. One cries aloud for the saving touch of humor that is said to relate the world. But "humanus sum" has no meaning for those who claim a grievance that the Christian deity is male! Nor for one who, while measuring the world's progress by the status of women at any given era, fails to recognize the mutual dependence of the sexes, and the inconsistency in the theory that makes woman the endower of all man's gifts, and then blames him for his defects.

Carried to their logical conclusion Miss Gamble's theories demand the restoration of woman to her pre-historic supremacy, political and domestic. Marriage must become a co-partnership with economic independence for woman, before it can be aught but "the most degrading form of slavery." Then man, we learn, must labor under continuous and increasing disadvantages produced by "his defective vision, his lack of physical endurance, his liability to various organic affections caused by structural defects, and his abnormal appetites which are constantly demanding for their gratification the things which are injurious to his mental and physical constitution."

Although a sharer in many of Miss Gamble's hopes for the independence and the education of women, I find a curious inability to take her as seriously as she undoubtedly, for her sincerity, deserves. Like many another enthusiast,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

she has erred through the over-zeal which when blinded stumbles apart from reason. Feminism under her narrowing point of view becomes as prejudicial a thing as the masculinity that she so fervently maligns. Isn't it a strange thing, anyway, that "the sexes" should have muddled through from the beginning of time, without mutual destruction?

Ellen Key on War

War, Peace and the Future, Consideration of Nationalism and Internationalism, and of the Relation of Women to War, by Ellen Key. New York: Putnams. $1.50.

WHEN Ellen Key talks about the horrors and irrationalities of war, she is impeccable—and uninteresting. If Theodore Roosevelt, David Lloyd George, or General Bernhardi, were to arise, read a text from the sixth chapter of the Gospel according to Mathew, and launch into a violent denunciation of all wars in general and this war in particular, we would read more than the headlines; but at this late stage what Ellen Key has to say on the subject simply doesn't interest us.

It is all very enlightened and perfectely true, and no doubt it would do many people good to read the book. But they are the very people who won't read it. And people who have read Francis Neilson and Lowes Dickinson have read most of Ellen Key's message.

She urges that "the will for a sound national self-protection" will bring about the transformation from the old nationalism into the new internationalism. Her hope for peace rests, not upon a horror of war—to which subject she devotes a boresome chapter, nor on Biblical exegesis—although she, who has never professed Christianity, delights in the uncomfortable position of those who take their Bible literally, nor yet upon the creation of legal machinery; but, as with Alfred Fried, upon the realization of an international community of interest. She agrees further that "an international law without arms to enforce its verdicts would be worthless."

But she suggests a much neglected distinction when she says that "Patriotism demands of a people, before all things, that they act rightly. The cry of nationalism is 'my country, right or wrong!'" It is not necessary to accept definitions of patriotism made in Germany by General Leonard Wood and the British War Tribunals, and burn the flag in a melting-pot to make it a symbol of justice. It would be easier to educate the Fourth of July orators in internationalism than to silence them or outshout them.

Ellen Key is most interesting when she talks about the position of women after the war. She thinks polygamy will be encouraged, if not by law, at least by custom. She expresses a prim delight that there will be a tardy recognition of love-unions which lack the conventional sanction, and leaves further speculation for the reader. She hastens on to tell us of the great menace that confronts the race: that its women may bear children, not out of love for the child or its father, but out of love for the state. The prospect of such patriotic disloyalty to the "higher instincts of love," which would be in effect but a realization for military purposes of the human breeding farms advocated by eugenists from Plato to Karl Pearson, distresses Ellen Key more than any other of her visions of the aftermath of war. She fears that mothers will offer children unwanted and unnumbered on the altar of Moloch. Of what use will be the suffrage, she asks, if women tamely accept the position of brood-mares?

Viewed from her mount of etherealized love, most women in this world to-day are little better than brood-mares. Most women patiently, wearily, ignorantly, bear child after child. The war will not change things for the worse. Some women will for the first time in their lives feel that they are bearing children for an ideal. The ideal may be perverted, but it is better than nothing. Women have been pried from their "pedestals" in their homes, and the resultant economic emancipation may be for good or for ill, but it will certainly not tend to increase the number of women who consider that their function in life is fulfilled by patient breeding.

To say that Ellen Key's endless emphasis on the importance of a sense of responsibility in love is Victorian and platitudinous is not to say that it is false. Miss Rebecca West some months ago expressed her irritation because Ellen Key wanted love to be a "consciously formative art," and she protested against making motherhood a "perpetual spiritual picnic." She would have love the "unforced, unconscious flowering of the soul" where "the heart loves and does not know that it loves"; and apparently she would have motherhood just as simple and unconscious—a sort of perpetual twilight sleep.

Ellen Key is not scientific: she is an uncritical believer in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. She is prosy, and her prosiness is exaggerated by the lack of style of her Germanic translator. She is uncritical: exaggerates the significance of the women's peace movement. She is exactly what Miss West says she is, "a great good woman-soul rather than a great good woman-brain." But however extreme may be Miss West's respect for that supposedly more masculine organ, the brain, some mere men are coming to have a vague respect for the feminine intuitions that are characteristic of Ellen Key's thinking.

L. S. G.

What Rhythm Is

The Rhythm of Prose, by William Morrison Patterson. New York: Columbia University Press. $1.50 net.

INTUITIVE criticism has always thought of rhythm as if it existed in language. Innumerable methods of scansion, even attempts at psychological theory, have gone to the text in order to systematize its qualities and quantities. Mr. Patterson now applies modern psychological technique to a new inquiry. What goes on in the person who feels the rhythm? How do people differ in this respect? Why do certain passages seem rhythmical, and to whom? "Rhythm is thus regarded as first of all an experience, established, as a rule, by motor performance, of however rudimentary a nature. Only in a transferred sense (as potential) can rhythm be said to exist on the printed page of the text." Objective studies of rhythmic passages must necessarily remain mere testimony; but experiment such as Mr. Patterson's may give us a scientific basis for the whole matter.

Twelve subjects or "observers" were chosen, and were tested by a series of laboratory experiments too exhaustive to summarize here. Full data are given in the book, and may be checked up by the psychologist—who would be the only critic fitted to pass on their accuracy or relevance. But some of the conclusions from the work can be roughly stated, and they throw a good deal of light on current discussions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

People differ in their ability to feel rhythm; but those who feel it most surely are those to whom it comes as a series of time units rather than as a series of stresses. Among the former some have the rhythmical faculty so well developed that they are called by the author "aggressive timers." The more expert of these (in his experiments represented by a professional musician) are able to organize into a subjective rhythmic tune practically *any series of sounds,* whether designed to be rhythmical or purely haphazard.

This astonishing ability (forecast by Wundt) is the result of the way in which the feeling of rhythm arises. Every person experiences a subjective pulse of time, a regular but elastic beat differing in average length according to the person. The length of this beat seems to have some relation to breathing, or to the habitual walking pace, or some other similar habit. Any external series of beats is measured off and felt as rhythmical through its comparison with this subjective beat. The process of so relating a superimposed series to a basic one is familiar in music, and is called syncopation. The external beats, when they do not coincide with the internal ones, are grouped and substituted for them. The balancing of these groups with each other constitutes the rhythmical experience.

There are two criteria of the pleasantness of rhythmical experience. One is the ease with which it is produced, and the other is the spontaneity (judged by surprise) with which it is felt. Thus, a series of regular tom-tom beats is easily felt to be rhythmical, even by an undeveloped "timer," and to him it may be pleasant. But a series is more pleasant to an aggressive "timer" if variations are introduced to cause surprise and relieve the monotony—variations, however, which are not so difficult for him to organize that they tend to break up the rhythmic nature of the experience. In the appreciation of language, the appropriateness of the rhythmic movement to the underlying mood and thought also affects the pleasure of the experience. If, in order to accent and measure off a sentence so as to bring out its meaning, we must falsify its natural rhythmic "swing," that sentence produces an uncomfortable feeling, and vice versa.

The author attempts a definition of the difference between prose and verse. Language is felt as prose, he says, so long as syncopation and substitution predominate over coincidence between the accented syllables and the subjective time unit. When coincidence predominates, language is felt as verse.

From this definition the author goes on to an interesting theory about free verse. There is no medium ground, he contends, between a prose experience and a verse experience. If one is led to expect the predominance of syncopation and substitution in a passage, he goes on expecting it, and is jolted if he suddenly comes to lines in which coincidence predominates. Most free verse, he says, is really an alternation between verse experience and prose experience, in which the reader must continually jump the fence from one to the other. Such jerky activity, he infers, is unpleasant to the aggressive "timer." He admits, however, that a sort of compromise might be reached if the poet would balance his broader arrangements or groups of words, and within these groups would avoid regularity of incidence. He further admits that some forms of vers libre are merely amplifications of accepted types of verse having irregular lines and lacking rhyme.

The author has done an immeasurable service in breaking up the whole technical jargon of prose rhythm and prosody —the iambs, spondees, dactyls, anapaests, the amphibrachs, antibacchics, and proceleusmatics—and substituting for them a comprehensive and natural basis for the whole discussion, more akin to the elastic conceptions of music. It has been impossible here to suggest some of the more intricate phases of the theory—but in these the lay reader as well as the psychologist will find much suggestive material.

The present reader doubts whether Mr. Patterson's experiments were sufficiently exhaustive to establish his theory about verse. It still seems possible that good free verse may be most irritating not to the aggressive "timer" but to the more passive one who likes the tom-tom, but is not skilled enough to organize the more subtle variations. And one has occasionally the itch to warn Mr. Patterson against assuming—as he almost does—that his scientific investigation is a necessary preliminary to either the instinctive creation or the appreciation of rhythm in language. Investigation of this sort can interpret experience, but science can neither make nor deny the realities of aesthetic expression.

G. S.

The Archaic Essay

An Apology for Old Maids, and Other Essays, by Henry Dwight Sedgwick. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.50.

EVERY new book of essays comes as a challenge. Today this special "pure" form of literature awakens some uneasy feeling of the incongruous. The disheartening extent and depth of modern knowledge, with its multifarious divisions, its distinctions and specializations, its technical terminologies, makes mere lay speculation seem a dilettante impertinence. Except in the more arid and cloistered magazines the essay has capitulated to the special article. Criticism, of course, is a special literary genre, yet book-reviewers are comfortable only when they are expository. As never before writers resent being damned with the faint adjective of "clever." Even opinion dislikes the irresponsibility of just personal thought and puts its claims to validity on some pragmatic appropriation of selected objective fact. In spite of the just claims and warnings of the humanists, science has knocked too loudly at the door of the younger generation not to have feminized and beclouded the essay in the distinctly American detestation for detachment. Hence Mr. Sedgwick will not be offended as he certainly will not misunderstand the statement that there is a strongly anachronistic flavor to An Apology for Old Maids, and Other Essays. He is only in the same boat with other essayists of the "pure" type.

I believe there is considerable justification for this contemporary suspicion of what is "merely" literary. Historically, the essay arose as the handmaiden of philosophical speculation when philosophy was a generous and inclusive name for knowledge in general and had not sharpened and refined itself to the jejune pen-point of metaphysics or that scarecrow of liberal thought, epistemology. The happiest development of the essay was in the revelatory vein, the biographical memorabilia of Lamb who used English with a singularly gracious clarity that has never since been attained by those who have copied merely his style. In this form the essay is imperishable, but its initial demand is very severe—that there shall be some definite personality to be revealed. Arrogance, of course, is wholly distinct from this; in a way, arrogance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is only the shouting of the barren to keep their courage up. Now most of us to-day, caught in the swirl of an industrialized, non-traditional, and mechanized society that has not yet found itself, are rather sharply aware of thinness of soul. We are reluctant to unlock the doors of personality if they may lead to empty rooms. We take refuge in the third person. We are spiritually too timorous to become decent essayists. Certainly Mr. Sedgwick in his book has attempted very little of this sort of thing. There is none of that self-depiction, which, coupled with insight, adds another chapter to the eternal books of human character, and which gives the essay its one real claim. There is, instead, the curious jumble of opinion, exposition and meticulous literary expression which constitute the modern essay, a sort of archaic hybrid. The style has all the charm which attaches to slightly deliquescent gentility or a carefully calculated odor of sanctity, like Belasco doing Marie-Odile. Mr. Sedgwick himself is in all probability a vigorous and amusing and intelligent man, but this price of stylistic thin perfectionism is the inevitable price he has to pay to the reader's spontaneous impression for attempting something which, whether we like it or not, simply does not fit into our new way of life.

For example, there is an important and illuminating idea in The Classics Again. Mr. Sedgwick points out in admirably lucid fashion that the traditional view of the classic authors of Greece and Rome is almost completely erroneous. The conventional concept is of men in whom moderation, balance and fine proportion reached its highest human expression. As a matter of fact, they were in temperament mercurial, passionate and hot-headed. The notion of "nothing too much" really came from the form of the two languages in which they had to write. In essence, the great classic "restraint" was a matter of verbs, grammatical felicity and subtle strength and plasticity of tongue. Now this is a first-rate and interesting thesis, but I cannot escape feeling that Mr. Sedgwick shirked his job. He has put this in the form of a tepidly imitative Socratic dialogue which, in so far as it is successfully that, is quite irrelevant. An organized and thought-out frank exposition would have been not only more intellectually straightforward, but more effective too. We should have been given not an essay, but an article. Of course there is no reason why such an article—or any article—should be dryly written. The error seems to be in fancying that a vigorous and clarified idea is a kind of intellectual decoration to a literary form, *per se,* whereas literary form is truly but a means or medium. It is not the end of writing, but the instrument.

In his other essays, particularly A Forsaken God, one can see even more clearly the harm that the "pure" essay form does to ideas. Mr. Sedgwick is really voicing a temperamental liking for rather detached contemplation. This is not only a legitimate aesthetic pleasure—aside from its satisfaction of the truth-seeking or curiosity instinct—but Mr. Sedgwick is entirely right in supposing it to be going rapidly out-of-date in America. Furthermore, although a really self-conscious and alert democracy will give due place and honor to the "intellectual priesthood," as Mr. Sedgwick, himself too sceptical, terms it, he has a better sense of values than his critics in deploring such an intense utilitarianism. But the manner in which his position is disclosed is merely that of any uncritical apologist who uses terms like democracy and aristocracy for their fringe of hostile or friendly emotional values with no serious attempt to define their implications. Nothing emerges from such unscientific and haphazard speculation except a certain gratitude that it was not trivially or cheaply written.

H. S.

TIFFANY & CO.

CLOCKS

HALL, MANTEL, DESK AND TRAVELING CLOCKS

FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

Recent Publications

Military and Naval America, by Captain Harrison S. Kerrick, C.A.C., U. S. Army. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. $2.00.

IF Mr. Kerrick's book seems to-day a bit out-moded, the fault is certainly not the author's. A description of our present small regular force has almost the same contemporary interest that an exposition of the make-up of the original Expeditionary Force would have had in England when the billboards were appealing for recruits to Kitchener's Army. To-day, our whole army system is on the point of undergoing a complete reorganization, and the kind of army Mr. Kerrick describes will seem archaic in terms of the fast-approaching giant of two millions. Yet the book does serve a function in its account of the nucleus from which our new army must spring. That account is crisp and careful and conscientious. Every detail and aspect of the organization and personnel of our present army and navy is included, even to a glossary of military and naval terms, which in the months to come may take on for all civilians a more poignant than academic interest. There are maps, illustrations, diagrams and statistics. There are historical facts, lists of military training schools, descriptions of the signal corps, the defense of the harbors, the cavalry, the medical corps, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RED GUM

"THE LOVELIEST CABINET WOOD IN ALL THE WORLD."

NATIVE TO AMERICA. PLENTIFUL. BEAUTIFUL. WORKABLE. TRY IT.

RED GUM

Gum Lumber Mfrs. Assn.

1322 Bank of Commerce Bldg., Memphis, Tenn.

The Revolution In Germany

Will the people revolt?
Or
Be starved into submission?
Read

SHORT RATIONS

By Madeleine Z. Doty

A stirring picture of life today among the German people, by an alert American woman who did not take official Germany's word for things, but saw them with her own eyes.

The N. Y. *Evening Post* says:—
"One of the most concrete revelations of conditions within the German Empire that has yet appeared. The book is a graphic account of an ever-growing tragedy."

At your book-store.

The Century Company, New York, *Publishers*

"Mademoiselle Miss"

Letters from an American girl serving with the rank of Lieutenant in a French Army Hospital at the front.

Published for the benefit of the American Fund for French Wounded.

Price 50 Cents

W. A. BUTTERFIELD, 59 Bromfield St., Boston

UNION PACIFIC

Standard Road of the West

After many centuries of dignified and unchallenged supremacy, OAK, "The Pride of the Permanent Home," remains today the world's premier hardwood. (And everybody knows it.) OAK is the first hardwood you naturally think of, and the last for which you will ever relinquish your inherited preference.

GOOD OAK FURNITURE justifies a keen search, critical insistence and a special order if need be.

THE AMERICAN OAK MFRS. ASSN. know the whys and hows of Oak. Ask them any sort of questions. Please address R. 1417, 14 Main St., Memphis, Tenn.

naval militia, the U. S. Coast Guard, the Boy Scouts, even Garrison Life in the Army and Navy. An uninspired but honestly done job. Mr. Kerrick has not attempted to coördinate his facts or illuminate them with criticism. He has attempted to record them—and has succeeded.

The Locust Flower and The Celibate, by Pauline Brooks Quinton. Boston: Sherman, French & Co. $1.00.

SUCH a little play as The Celibate by Miss Quinton justifies the suspicion which should greet every historical play. Her creative impulse is too weak to envisage and mould the actual world, and it meets the world of other centuries only as it has been filtered through conventional literature. Merely the expected agonies and emotions and reactions are encountered, the time-honored situations and the time-honored moods accompanying them. It makes a curious study in what one might call old-fashioned imaginative respectability. Her other play, The Locust Flower, Miss Quinton calls a "fantasy." Even sensuous waywardnesses are here made conventional.

Contributors

to this issue

LEO STEIN is a New Yorker who has lived much in France and Italy and has made a life-study of painting.

H. SIDEBOTHAM is the military critic of the Manchester Guardian, and the editor of the Manchester Guardian's History of the War. He is a contributor to the Atlantic Monthly.

SIGNE K. TOKSVIG was graduated from Cornell University in 1916 and is on the staff of the New Republic.

It Is Very Difficult to get jaded readers to pay attention to book advertisements; but if a hundred people of "The New Republic" would read Francis R. Bellamy's new novel, "The Balance," a thousand would later.

Published by

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & CO.

LE PAGE'S GLUE

HANDY TUBES

A HOUSEHOLD NECESSITY 10

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED